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Nine states' have enacted statutes governing arbitration with an
international context during the last decade. Florida began the
trend in 1986, and most recently North Carolina and Oregon have
followed suit.2 Other states, such as Michigan and New Mexico, have
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I Throughout this article "'state" refers to one of the 50 states of the United States,
while "State" refers to countries, in the sense of nation-state.
2 CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1297.11-1297.432 (West Supp. 1992); UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50a-101-
50a-136 (West Supp. 1991); Florida International Arbitration Act, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 684.01-684.35 (West 1992); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-30-9-9-42 (Michie Supp. 1991);
Hawaii International Arbitration, Mediation and Conciliation Act, HAW. REV. STAT.
§§ 658D-1-658D-9 (Supp. 1991); Maryland International Commercial Arbitration Act,
MD. CTS. & JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-2B-01-3-2B-08 (Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 1-567.30-1-567.68 (Supp. 1991); Oregon International Commercial Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 36.450-36.558 (1991); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN., arts.
249-1-249-43 (West Supp. 1992). For an analysis of individual states' legislation, see Al-
bert S. Golbert & Daniel M. Kolkey, California's Adoption of a Code for International Commercial
Arbitration and Conciliation, 10 Lov. L.A. Irr'L & COMP. L.J. 583 (1988); Carlos E. Loumiet,
Introductory Note, 26 I.L.M. 949 (1987) (Florida); Carlos E. Loumiet et al., Proposed Florida
International Arbitration Act, 16 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 949 (1987); Judith A. Mellman,
Seeking Its Place in the Sun: Florida's Emerging Role in International Commercial Arbitration, 19 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 363 (1987-88); Review of Selected 1988 California Legislation, 20 PAC.
L.J. 425, 491 (1988). Previous analyses synthesizing the state acts examined them against
the backdrop of federal law in the international context. See e.g., AndreJ. Brunel, A Propo-
sal to Adopt UNCITRAL 's Model Law on International Arbitration as Federal Law, 25 TEXAS INT'L
L.J. 43 (1990); Jack Garvey & Totten Heffelfinger, Towards Federalizing U.S. International
Commercial Arbitration Laws, 25 INT'L LAW 209, 211-21 (1991); J. Stewart McClendon, State
International Arbitration Laws: Are They Needed or Desirable?, I AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 245, 246-
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the concept under study.
During the same ten years, Congress has amended the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) to permit the act of state defense3 and has
added legislation to implement the Inter-American (Panama) Arbi-
tration Convention. 4 While the United States Supreme Court has
praised expansively the use of international arbitration,5 the Court
has also underscored the place of state statutes in disputes otherwise
covered by the FAA. 6 Additionally, the arbitration of commercial
disputes according to international principles has received increased
emphasis. For example, the 1979 Algiers Accords, which resolved
the Iran Hostage Crisis, provided for arbitration of U.S. claimants'
disputes before three-member tribunals in The Hague. 7
The homogenization of these seemingly disparate strands of ar-
48 (1990); William P. Mills, III, Note, State International Arbitration Statutes and the U.S. Arbi-
tration Act: Unifying the Availability of Interim Relief, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 604 (1989-90).
3 9 U.S.C. § 15 (1988 and Supp. 11 1990); 9 U.S.C. § 16 was added to regularize
rights of appeal from orders granting or denying stays in arbitration. Pub. L. No. 101-552,§ 5, 104 Stat. 2745, also recast 9 U.S.C. § 10 (Supp. I 1990).
4 9 U.S.C. §§ 301-07 (Supp. I 1990), implementing the Inter-American [Panama]
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration,Jan. 30, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 336 (1975)
[hereinafter Panama Convention] (reprinted in 9 U.S.C.A. § 301 (West Supp. 1991)). This
was the third multilateral treaty binding the United States and its nationals to international
arbitration standards. The first was the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes Between State and Nationals of Other States, Convention approved Mar. 18, 1965, 17
U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention], implemented by 22
U.S.C. 88 1650-50a (1988). The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 and 751 U.N.T.S.
398 [hereinafter New York Convention], was ratified by the United States in 1970 and is
implemented by 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1988). The most recent multilateral agreement pro-
viding for arbitration of investment disputes is the Convention Establishing the Multilat-
eral Investment Guarantee Agency, Oct. 11, 1985 [hereinafter MIGA Convention], 12
I.L.M. 1607 (1985), implemented by 22 U.S.C. §§ 290k-290k-10 (1988). The MIGA Con-
vention, supra, art. 57, 24 I.L.M. at 1626, and its Annex II, Settlement of Disputes Between
a Member and the Agency, 24 I.L.M. at 1631-35, disclose that the preferred method of
dispute resolution is negotiation, followed by arbitration or conciliation. Other major
multilateral agreements on arbitration include the European Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration, Apr. 21, 1961, 484 U.N.T.S. 349, and the former Soviet bloc's
Convention on Settlement by Arbitration of Civil Law Disputes Resulting from Economic,
Scientific and Technical Cooperation, May 20, 1972, 13 I.L.M. 5 (1974). Bilateral agree-
ments may also regulate arbitration. See, e.g., Agreement on Trade Relations,Jul. 7, 1979,
China-U.S., art. 8, 31 U.S.T. 4651. Texts of the major multilateral agreements relating to
arbitration, as well as arbitral rules and other materials, plus references to U.S. and other
maritime nations' bilateral treaties, which include provisions for arbitration, can be found
in 6A BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY vol. 6A, ch. 7 and vol. 6C, ch. 15, docs. 15-1 to 15-IC
(Michael M. Cohen ed., 7th ed. rev. 1991). See also, Scoreboard of Adherences to Transnational
Arbitration Treaties, 5 News & Notes from the Instit. for Transnat'1 Arb. S-I (No. 4, 1990).
5 See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
624-32 (1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1972).
6 Volt Inform. Serv. Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 475-79 (1989).
7 Declaration of Algeria Concerning Settlement of Claims by the United States and
Iran with Respect to Resolution of the Crisis Arising Out of the Detention of 52 U.S.
Nationals in Iran, with Undertakings and Escrow Agreement, Jan. 19, 1981, [hereinafter
Settlement Declaration] arts. 2-3, 20 I.L.M. 230-32 (1981); see also Dames & Moore v. Re-
gan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). For commentary on the work of the Tribunal, see sources cited
by Mellman, supra note 2, at 381 n. I 1l.
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bitration law can be illustrated by the influence that the 1985 United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
Model Law8 has had on state international arbitration statutes9 and
on institutional rules chosen for arbitration under the FAA or other
federal legislation' ° where the parties have chosen institutional rules
close in terms to the Rules. t An additional illustration is provided
by the adoption of UNCITRAL's Arbitration Rules (1976) by the
Iran-U.S. Arbitral Tribunal. 12 Alongside this developing harmony
within which the state acts have appeared, however, the question
8 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration, U.N. GAOR, 40th sess. Supp. No. 17 at 81-93, U.N. Doc. A/40/17
(1985), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1302 (1985) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law]. HOWARD
M. HOLTZMANN &JOSEPH E. NEUHAUS, A GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTER-
NATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1989) offers detailed commentary and publishes the
comprehensive "legislative history" of the Model Law. Researchers should compare their
states' enacted variations with the Model Law, keeping in mind that many states' jurispru-
dence takes a restrictive approach to legislative history, if such is available, which may not
be the situation in many cases. 'See e.g., Electric Supp. Co. v. Swain Elec. Co., 403 S.E.2d
291, 295 (N.C. 1991). Thus, detailed interpretations like HOLTZMANN & NEUHAUS, supra,
may not be binding if a state act is ambiguous. The U.N. Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) is a specialized commission created by the U.N. General Assem-
bly to harmonize and unify international trade law. UNCITRAL is limited to 36 States who
participate on a regional, rotational basis. Delegates are "a wholesome mix of academic
specialists in commercial and comparative law, practicing lawyers, and members of gov-
ernment ministries with years of experience in international lawmaking." Id. at 45, citing
G.A. Res. 40/71, U.N. GAOR 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 307, U.N. Doc. A/40/53; G.A.
Res. 28/3508, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess. Supp. No. 30, at 145, U.N. Doc. A/9030; JOHN
HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION 51 (1982). UNCITRAL has been involved in other arenas of international
commercial law, e.g., carriage of goods by sea. See Joseph C. Sweeney, UNCITRAL and the
Hamburg Rules-The Risk Allocation Problem in Maritime Transport of Goods, 22J. MAR. L. & CoM.
511, 520-30 (1991). UNCITRAL decided to prepare a model law, the UNCITRAL Model
Law, to avoid the costs, delays and reservations incident to negotiating a new convention
on the subject. The Model Law is thus available as a guide for nations, which might make
adjustments for compatibility with national legal systems. For a history of the preparation
of the UNCITRAL Model Law, see generally HOLTZMANN & NEUHAUS, supra at 9-15, and
David W. Rivkin & Frances L. Kellner, In Support of the F.A.A.: An Argument Against U.S.
Adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law, I AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 535, 541-42 (1990). Thus far
seven States-among them Australia, Canada and Hong Kong-have adopted the UNCI-
TRAL Model Law. Id. at 542, 559-60. Lord Justice Mustill, A New Arbitration Act for the
United Kingdom? The Response of the Departmental Advisory Committee to the UNCITRAL Model
Law, 6 ARB. INT'L 3, 37 (1990), recommended addition of parts of the UNCITRAL Model
Law along with other improvements. Cf Michael Kerr, Arbitration and the Courts: The UNCI-
TRAL Model Law, 34 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 1, 16-19 (1985), who found most of it
"acceptable."
9 Compare UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 8, with, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§§ 1297.11-1297.432 (West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50a-101-50a-136
(West Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-567.30-1-567.68 (Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 36.450-36.558 (1991); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN., arts. 249-1-249-43 (West Supp.
1992).
10 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1988), 301-07 (Supp. 11 1990).
II Compare, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 8, with AMER. ARB. Ass'N, INTER-
NATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES (1991), reprinted in 2 WORLD ARB. & MED. REP. (BNA) 78
(1991) [hereinafter AAA Int'l Arb. R.]; see also American Arbitration Association s New Rules
Become Effective March 1, 2 WORLD ARB. & MED. REP. (BNA) 59.
12 Settlement Declaration, supra note 7, art. 3, 20 I.L.M. at 231, referring to U.N.
Commission on International Trade Law, Decision on UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, U.N.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [VOL. 17
arises as to this legislation's place in an international arbitration
arena dominated by national norms, such as treaty terms, the U.S.
Code, or perhaps federal common law. Some commentators have
argued that federal law should apply exclusively to international ar-
bitrations. Accordingly, they contend that the solution is revising
federal legislation, perhaps along the lines of the 1985 UNCITRAL
Model Law, in addition to applying federal common law for the
interstices. 13
This Article's thesis is that while international agreements to
which the United States is a party, federal statutes, and federal com-
mon law necessarily trump state law,' 4 where applicable, there is an
appropriate place for the state acts. Particularly, this is the current
situation since Congress has not yet revised federal statutes gov-
erning arbitration. Even where federal law does apply, the state acts
may supply norms if adopted as rules. The state acts may play an
interstitial role in a transaction otherwise governed by federal law.
Even if federal law controls, the state acts may be factors in inform-
Doc. A/CN-9/IX/CRP.4/Add. 1 (1976), as amended, U.N. Doc. ACN.9/SR.178 (1976),
reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 701 (1976).
Is See, e.g., Brunel, supra note 2, at 61-68 (advocating federal legislation rather than
state statutes); James H. Carter, FederalArbitration Act Seen As Out of Step With Modern Laws, 5
NEWS & NOTES FROM THE INSTIT. FOR TRANSNAT'S ARB. 1, 4 (Nov. 4, 1990) (noting that the
American Bar Association's International Law and Practice Section "has come out flatly in
favor of replacement of the FAA with the model law, at least for international commercial
transactions"); Committee on Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution of the Asso-
ciation of the Bar of the City of New York, Adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration as Federal or State Legislation, ARBITRATION AND THE LAW 1988-89
250, 259-60, (1989) [hereinafter Committee Rep.] (recommending federal legislation to
permit interim measures and to allow a U.S. Court to specify venue for arbitration, thereby
parallelling UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 8, arts. 9, 20, at 1304, 1307); Charles A.
Hunnicutt et al., Report to the Washington Foreign Law Society on the UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration, 3 OHIO ST.J. Disp. RESOL. 303, 330 (1988) [hereinafter
Washington Foreign Law Society Rep.] (recommending federal legislation to permit in-
terim measures, challenges to arbitrators, a U.S. Court to specify venue for arbitration,
and choice of law as provided in UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 8, arts. 9, 12-13, 20,
16, 28, at 1304-07, 1309, but also encouraging the states to adopt their versions of the
UNCITRAL Model Law); Daniel M. Kolkey, Reflections on the U.S. Statutory Framework for
International Commercial Arbitrations: Its Scope, Its Shortcomings, and the Advantages of U.S. Adop-
tion of the UNCITRAL Model Law, I AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 491, 492, 506-10 (1990) (urging
Congressional enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law while criticizing the state interna-
tional arbitration acts as "further aggravat[ing] the uncertain relationship between federal
and state arbitration laws and continu[ing] (if not exacerbat[ing]) the lack of uniformity
among states' laws"); Garvey & Heffelfinger, supra note 2, at 211-21 (advocating federal
legislation rather than state statutes); McClendon, supra note 2, at 259-60 (praising the
FAA, particularly when coupled with institutional arbitration rules, rather than the
"hodgepodge" of state acts); Rivkin & Kellner, supra note 8, at 557-61 (noting gaps in the
UNCITRAL Model Law and the low number of States that have adopted it, while arguing
for continuation of the FAA with amendments for provisional remedies and court determi-
nation of venue and the present system of case laws to fill other gaps). The career of the
Hamburg Rules to govern carriage of goods by sea, also drafted by UNCITRAL, has been
similar. Sweeney, supra note 8, at 530-38. This debate may have been part of the reason
for UNCITRAL's decision to promote a model statute instead of a draft convention like
the Hamburg Rules. See also supra note 8.
14 U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
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ing the policy for the choice of federal law. In any future amend-
ments of the federal arbitration statutes, Congress may choose to
incorporate state law by reference.' 5
This Article begins with a survey of the state international arbi-
tration acts in Part II. Part III analyzes international agreements and
federal law applicable to transnational arbitrations and examines the
place of the state acts in the federal law context. Projections for the
future are suggested in Part IV.
II. The State International Arbitration Acts
In terms of their individual structure and comprehensiveness,
the state acts fall into three groups: (1) legislation supplementary to
the individual state's basic arbitration statutes,' 6 which usually follow
the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA);' 7 (2) self-contained legislation
largely following the UNCITRAL Model Law;' 8 and (3) self-con-
tained legislation not generally following the UNCITRAL Model
Law.' 9 Nearly all state statutes show the influence of institutional
arbitration rules, and all the self-contained versions have provisions
similar to the UAA. Some legislation includes provisions for addi-
tional alternative dispute resolution methods, 20 a subject peripheral
to this article.
A. Policy, Scope and Definitions
In Volt Information Services, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, the U. S.
15 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which govern traditional litigation, are re-
plete with incorporations of state law by reference. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P.
4(c)(2)(C)(ii)(state service methods as alternatives for federal methods); FED. R. Civ. P.
4(e) (state service methods mandatory for out-of-state defendants if no federal statute ap-
plies, Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff& Co., 484 U.S. 97, 105-08 (1987)); FED. R. Civ.
P. 64 (state provisions for prejudgment seizure of property mandatory if no federal statute
applies). Although most of the Rules are Supreme Court-promulgated pursuant to the
Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988), a few are positive legislation, e.g., parts of
Rule 4. Combs v. Nick Garin Trucking, 825 F.2d 437, 442 n.44 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
16 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-30-9-9-42 (Michie Supp. 1991).
17 Compare Ga. Code Ann. §§ 9-9-1-9-9-18 (Michie Supp. 1991) with UNIF. ARBITRA-
TION ACT, 7 U.L.A. 1 (1985 & Supp. 1991). Nearly every state has a version of the Uniform
Act. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT, 7 U.L.A. I (Supp. 1991); George K. Walker, Court-Ordered
Arbitration Comes to North Carolina and the Nation, 21 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 901, 906 (1986).
18 CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1297.11-1297.432 (West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 50a-101-50a-136 (West Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-567.30-1-567.68
(Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 36.450-36.558 (Supp. 1991); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.,
arts. 249-1-249-43 (West Supp. 1991).
19 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 684.01-684.35 (1992); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 658D-I-658D-9
(Supp. 1991).
20 See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1297.341-1297.432 (West Supp. 1992)(concilia-
tion); HAW. REV. STATS §§ 658D-1, 658-2(2), 658-4(b), 658D-5, 658D-7(c) (Supp. 1991)
(mediation, conciliation, other forms of dispute resolution in lieu of litigation); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 36.450(6), 36.452-36.454, 36.476, 36.528-36.554 (Supp. 1991) (conciliation);
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. arts. 249-1-249-2, 249-12, 249-34-249-43 (West Supp. 1991)
(conciliation).
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Supreme Court upheld the application of state arbitral procedures in
a FAA-covered transaction where there was no controlling FAA pro-
vision. 21 Perhaps attempting to take advantage of the policy thrust
of Volt, several state legislatures have enacted international arbitra-
tion statutes with policy statements. North Carolina's statute has a
typical provision:
It is the policy of the State of North Carolina to promote and facili-
tate international trade and commerce, and to provide a forum for
the resolution of disputes that may arise from participation therein.
Pursuant to this policy, the purpose of this Article is to encourage
the use of arbitration as a means of resolving such disputes, to pro-
vide rules for the conduct of arbitration proceedings, and to assure
access to the courts of this State for legal proceedings ancillary to
such arbitration. 22
Aside from stating that the UAA should be construed to effectu-
ate its general purpose of uniformity among states enacting it, the
UAA has no statement of policy. 23 However, decisional law has fre-
quently articulated a policy in favor of general arbitration. 24 The re-
sult is that among those states that either lack such a policy statement
or that link their international arbitration acts to their basic arbitra-
tion statutes, there is no stated policy for the legislation that might
influence the choice of law in a federal-state balance. 25
Article 1 of the UNCITRAL Model Law provides a statement of
those transactions normally covered by the legislation:
(1) This Law applies to international commercial** arbitration,
subject to any agreement in force between this State and any other
State or States.
(2) The provisions of this Law, except articles 8, 9, 35 and 36, ap-
ply only if the place of arbitration is in the territory of this State.
(3) An arbitration is international if-
(a) the parties to an arbitration agreement have, at the time
21 Volt Inform. Serv., Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 475-79 (1989). Bern-
hardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 200-02 (1956) held that State arbitration proce-
dures applied in diversity litigation where an intrastate transaction was involved. The FAA
applies only to interstate, foreign commercial and maritime transactions. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2
(1988). The FAA has no jurisdictional provision. By contrast, legislation implementing
the New York Convention, supra note 4, and the Panama Convention, supra note 4,
"deem[s]" actions or proceedings under the Conventions to arise under the laws and trea-
ties of the United States, i.e. under the federal question jurisdiction of the U.S. courts. 9
U.S.C. §§ 203 (1988), 302 (Supp. 11 1990). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988). See infra
notes 112-118 and accompanying text for analysis.
22 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.30 (Supp. 1991); Cf FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.02() (West
1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-30 (Michie Supp. 1991); HAw. REV. STAT. § 658D-2 (Supp.
1991); MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2B-02 (Michie Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 36.453 (1991). Cf ICSID Convention, supra note 4, Preamble, 17 U.S.T. 1272, 575
U.N.T.S. 160-62. Neither the New York or Panama Convention, supra note 4, nor their
U.S. implementing legislation have such policy statements.
23 UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT, § 21, 7 U.L.A. (1985).
24 See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
625 (1985).
25 See infra notes 137-72 and accompanying text.
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of the conclusion of that agreement, their places of business in
different States; or
(b) one of the following places is situated outside the State in
which the parties have their places of business:
(i) the place of arbitration if determined in, or pursu-
ant to, the arbitration agreement;
(ii) any place where a substantial part of the obliga-
tions of the commercial relationship is to be performed
or the place with which the subject-matter of the dispute
is most closely connected; or
(c) the parties have expressly agreed that the subject-matter
of the arbitration agreement relates to more than one country.
(4) For the purpose of paragraph (3) of this article:
(a) if a party has more than one place of business, the place
of business is that which has the closest relationship to the ar-
bitration agreement;
(b) if a party does not have a place of business, reference is
to be made to his habitual residence.
(5) This law shall not affect any other law of this State by virtue of
which certain disputes may not be submitted to arbitration or may
be submitted to arbitration only according to provisions other than
those of this Law.
An asterisk footnote in paragraph (1) above elaborates on the defini-
tion of "commercial":
** The term "commercial" should be given a wide interpretation
so as to cover matters arising from all relationships of a commercial
nature, whether contractual or not. Relationships of a commercial
nature include, but are not limited to, the following transactions:
any trade transaction for the supply or exchange of goods or serv-
ices; distribution agreement; commercial representation or agency;
factoring; leasing; construction of works; consulting; engineering; li-
censing; investment; financing, banking, insurance; exploitation
agreement or concession; joint venture and other forms of industrial
or business co-operation; carriage of goods or passengers by air,
sea, rail or road.26
The states following the Model Law track this format, with all but
Connecticut elevating the definition of "commercial" to the body of
the statutes and adding other examples. The state acts also conform
the Model Law to the definitional problem of "state of the United
States" versus "States" in the sense of "nation-states"; Connecticut
and Oregon refer to "countries" while North Carolina substitutes
"nations." The California and Texas versions boilerplate the Model
Law but add a definition that "the states of the United States, includ-
ing the District of Columbia, shall be considered 'one state'." In
these states, this wording leaves open to conjecture the status of Pu-
erto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and other possessions of the United
States. Although the Model Law refers to the residence of a party if
the party has no place of business, the states require a more signifi-
cant tie to a nation; habitual residence in all cases except North Car-
26 UNCITRAL Model Law, art. I, supra note 8, at 1302-03.
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olina, which stipulates domicile. The states' exclusion provisions are
similar to exceptions in the Model Law, although North Carolina
would allow contracting parties to exempt an agreement from statu-
tory coverage. All state legislation declares the truism that the acts
are subject to international agreements between the United States
and foreign nations. 27 North Carolina restates the Supremacy
Clause in that state law is subject to federal statutes. 28
Although other state acts appear to have borrowed from the
UNCITRAL model with respect to the definition of "commercial,"
there are significant differences and possible ambiguities among the
state variations. For example, the Florida act is not limited to com-
mercial matters; it could apply to a dispute "[b]ear[ing] some other
relation to one or more foreign countries." Although disputes con-
cerning "property located outside the United States" are within the
act's purview, and Florida real property interests are not covered un-
less there is an express submission under the state act, the status of
personal property within Florida is not clear. Although the UNCI-
TRAL Model Law jurisdictions limit coverage to transactions in
which the arbitration situs is within the state, the Florida statutory
coverage extends to arbitrations outside that state if either of the
parties agree that Florida law applies or conflict of laws principles
would declare that Florida law would apply to the contract or to rules
for arbitration.29 The Hawaii statute is similar to the Florida act. 30
The Maryland approach is even simpler; its act applies to agreements
where one party has a relevant place of business or, if no one has
such a place of business, property, performance or "some other rea-
sonable relation with 1 or more foreign countries" 3' suffices.
The Georgia Code has a narrow scope of applicability. Its act
27 Compare UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 1, supra note 8, at 1302-03 with CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE §§ 1297.11-1297.17 (West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-101
(West Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.31 (Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 36.453(5), 36.454 (1991); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 249-1 (West Supp. 1991). The
New York Convention, supra note 4, art. 1, allows a State to limit its application to awards
made in the territory of another contracting State, and to further limit application of the
Convention to transactions deemed commercial under the law of the State in which recog-
nition and enforcement is sought. The Panama Convention has no such limitations. See
Panama Convention, supra note 4, art. 6, 14 I.L.M. 337-38. For a typical Article I declara-
tion, see e.g., Declaration of the United States of America, Sept. 30, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 2566,
751 U.N.T.S. 398. Thus far, the New York Convention and other conventions to which
the United States is a party, the state international arbitration acts, whether incorporated
by reference in an agreement or stated to be applicable by their terms, may be helpful in
defining what is "commercial" in award enforcement under the treaties. See infra notes
137-57 and accompanying text.
28 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.31(a) (Supp. 1991).
29 Compare id. with FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 684.03(1)(b)(4), 684.03(1)(b)(1), 684.05(1)
(West 1992).
SO Compare HAW. REV. STAT. § 658D-4 (Supp. 1991) with FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 684.03,
684.05 (West 1992).
31 If a party has more than one place of business, that location having the closest
relationship to the arbitration agreement, or the place chosen by the parties, shall be the
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applies only if one party is domiciled outside the United States. If all
parties are domiciled or "established" within the United States, the
dispute must "bear . . . some relation to property, contractual per-
formance, investment, or other activity outside the United States."
Also excluded are exceptions listed in another section of the Georgia
Arbitration Code; these transactions include insurance contracts,
"[any loan agreement or consumer financing agreement" for less
than $25,000, consumer goods purchase contracts, sales or loan
agreements for residential real estate, and employment contracts
"unless the clause agreeing to arbitrate is initialed by all signatories"
when the agreement is signed. 32
Definitional provisions for UNCITRAL Model Law terms are
mirrored in state legislation patterned after the Model Law, 33 but
other definitions are also included.3 4 Probably the most important
definition is the limitation of the legislation to written agreements to
arbitrate, whether by a clause in a contract or by a separate agree-
ment, and in this regard, the states parallel the UAA and federal stat-
utes. State statutes following the UNCITRAL Model Law add a
broad definition of agreements in writing, encompassing exchanges
of correspondence or electronic communications (including, in the
case of North Carolina, facsimile transmission), and statements of
claim and defense where one party alleges an agreement to arbitrate
and the other denies it. Some statutes give the parties freedom to
place of business. Compare MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2B-01(b) (Michie Supp.
1991) with UNCITRAL Model Law, arts. 1(3)(b)(i), 1(4), supra note 8, at 1302-03.
32 Compare UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 1, supra note 8, at 1302-03, and the Califor-
nia, Connecticut, North Carolina, Oregon and Texas legislation, supra note 27, with GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-31, 9-9-2(c)(5)-(9) (Michie Supp. 1991).
33 Compare UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 2, supra note 8, at 1303, with CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 1297.21 (West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50a-102(a)-50a-102(c)
(West Supp. 1991); HAW. REV. STAT. § 658D-5 (Supp. 1991); MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 3-2B-01(c) (Michie Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.32(a) (Supp. 1991); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 36.450(1)-36.450(4) (1991); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 249-2, § 1 (West
Supp. 1991).
34 Compare UNIF. ARBITRATION AcT, § I, 7 U.L.A. 5 (1985) and 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988)
with UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 7, supra note 8, at 1304; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§§ 1297.71-1297.72 (West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-107 (West Supp.
1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 684.02(2), 684.04(4), 684.05, 684.06(1), 684.07 (West 1992),
which does not explicitly exclude oral agreements to arbitrate but which applies most pro-
visions to written agreements; GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-32 (Michie Supp. 1991); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 658D-4(d) (Supp. 1991), and MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2B-05 (Supp.
1991), which carry the same implications as the Florida act; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.37
(Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 36.450(4), 36.454(5) (1991); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 249-7 (West Supp. 1991). Language in the New York Convention, supra note 4, art. 2,
21 U.S.T. 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. 38-40, and the Panama Convention, supra note 4, art 1, 14
I.L.M. 336, is similar to the UNCITRAL Model Law, although the New York Convention
does not state the modalities of exchange of communications. The ICSID Convention,
supra note 4, art. 26, 17 U.S.T. 1281, 575 U.N.T.S. 176, declares that the parties consent to
arbitration shall, unless otherwise stated, be deemed to exclude any other remedy unless a
contracting State requires the exhaustion of administrative or judicial remedies as a condi-
tion of consent to ICSID arbitration.
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agree on narrower, or broader, terms for concluding an agreement
to arbitrate. North Carolina and Oregon add language from the
UAA, by providing that such agreements to arbitrate are irrevoca-
ble. 35 State statutes that are self-contained and lack such "irrevoca-
bility" language may inadvertently generate the same problem
present in the old UAA, which did not have an irrevocability provi-
sion and thus allowed parties to renege on arbitration, even after
including such a clause.
B. Pre-Hearing Procedures
The UNCITRAL Model Law, and its state counterparts, provide
for specific means of communication, such as notice to a party for
arbitration. Methods of notice include personal delivery, and deliv-
ery to place of business, "habitual residence," or mailing address,
such as a post office box. If after reasonable inquiry none of these
addresses can be ascertained, a written communication is deemed re-
ceived if sent to an addressee's last-known place of business, habitual
residence or mailing address by registered mail or "any other means
which provides a record of the attempt to deliver it." The communi-
cation is deemed received on the day of delivery. Although arbitra-
tion communication methods do not apply to litigation notices, the
methods appear to comport with the minimum requirements of the
U.S. Constitution for notice and general options under, e.g., the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. State versions may vary in certain criti-
cal details (such as North Carolina's provision for facsimile mail),
and the Civil Rules provide for timing service when filed, rather than
the "tag" theory of the UNCITRAL Model Law.3 6
35 North Carolina was one of a few states that enacted the old Uniform Arbitration
Act, which did not have the irrevocability feature of the current Act. Act of Mar. 4, 1927,
ch. 94, 1927 N.C. Sess. Laws 313, codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-544-1-567 (Supp.
1991), construed in Skinner v. Gaither Corp., 67 S.E.2d 267 (N.C. 1951), and repealed by
Act of May 22, 1973, ch. 676, § 1, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 1006, 1006-10. The earlier Act
was withdrawn in favor of the current version, which includes an irrevocability provision in
UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT, § 1, 7 U.L.A. 5 (1985). Prefatory Note, id. 1, 2.
36 Compare UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 3, supra note 8 at 1303; CAL. CIV, PROC. CODE
§§ 1297.31-1297.33 (West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-103 (West Supp.
1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.33 (Supp. 1991)(delivery to domicile instead of place of
habitual residence, use of facsimile allowed "if the communication or submission is in fact
received," and exclusion of administrative or special proceedings); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 36.458 (1991); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 249-3 (West Supp. 1991); with the Consti-
tutional requirements of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,
313-20 (1950) and later cases, e.g. Tulsa Prof'l Collection Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478
(1988); FED. R. Civ. P. 4, 5(a)-5(c). Other state international arbitration legislation does
not have specific notice provisions, e.g. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-30 (Michie Supp. 1991), re-
ferring to GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-8(a), which unfortunately does not have the flexibility of
notice provisions under the UNCITRAL Model Law. In that respect the Georgia Code
mirrors the Uniform Arbitration Act and federal legislation, which are silent on the point.
Rules of administrative institutions may fill the gap, however. See, e.g., AAA Int'l Arb. R.,
art. 19, supra note I1, at 80. The Panama Convention includes notice modalities, but the
New York Convention does not. See supra note 34. The ICSID Convention, supra note 4,
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The UNCITRAL Model Law and jurisdictions following it allow
parties to choose the place for arbitration. If the parties do not agree
on a site, the arbitral tribunal must do so, "having regard to the cir-
cumstances of the case, including the convenience of the parties."
And despite the parties' agreement on a site, the tribunal may meet
anywhere to consult among its members, to hear witnesses, experts
or parties, or to inspect property or documents. In contrast, the in-
stitutional arbitration rules allow the supervising institution (e.g.
those of the American Arbitration Association (AAA)) to choose a
place if the parties cannot agree, with final authority remaining in the
tribunal to choose a site. As under the UNCITRAL model, the tribu-
nal may move around to hold conferences, hear witnesses, or inspect
property or documents. 37 This flexibility might be contrasted with a
minor, and unfortunate, trend in general state arbitration legislation
that restricts arbitration hearings to a single state. 38 The date for
art. 36, 17 U.S.T. 1284-85, 575 U.N.T.S. 182, provides for request for arbitration but is
not specific as to the means for such. The MICA Convention, supra note 4, procedure is
more specific. See Annex II: Settlement of Disputes Between a Member and the Agency
Under Article 57, arts. 4(a), 5, 24 I.L.M. 1632, 1634.
37 Compare UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 20, supra note 8, at 1307; CAL. CIv. PROC.
CODE §§ 1297.201-1297.203 (West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-120 (West
Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684-13 (West 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.50 (Supp.
1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.492 (1991), also allowing a situs selection by the court if no
arbitrators have been chosen; TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN., art. 299-20 (West Supp. 1991);
with AAA Int'l Arb. R. 13, supra note 11, at 80. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-8(a), 9-9-30 (Michie
Supp. 1991) is to the same effect as the UNCITRAL Model Law, although the reference to
"county" in GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-8(a) may introduce ambiguities for international con-
tracts stating a site outside the United States or in Alaska, with its boroughs, Louisiana,
with its parishes, or Virginia, with its separate city and county governments. UNIF. ARBI-
TRATION ACT, § 5(a), 7 U.L.A. 99-100 (1985) states that unless the parties agree, the arbi-
trators shall choose a site; there is no discretionary language to take into account the
circumstances of the case. The FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988), is silent on the point; 9 U.S.C.
§ 206 (1988) and 9 U.S.C. § 302 (Supp. II 1990), in implementing the New York and
Panama Conventions, supra note 4, provide that the court must direct arbitration at the
place chosen by the parties. Courts outside the United States can also direct arbitration at
a site chosen by the parties. Statement of Richard D. Kearney, Chairman of the Secretary
of State's Advisory Committee on Private International Law, Feb. 9, 1970, appendix to
SEN. FOR. RELS. COMM., FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS, S. REP. No. 91-702, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 7 (1970) [hereinafter Statement of Richard D. Kearney]. Not surprisingly, courts
have divided on whether they can direct arbitration at a site when the parties have failed to
name one. Compare, e.g., Bauhinia Corp. v. China Nat'l Mach. & Equip. Import & Export
Corp., 819 F.2d 247, 250 (9th Cir. 1987) (district court must use 9 U.S.C. § 4 authority to
direct arbitration within the district) with Oilex A.G. v. Mitsui & Co. (USA), 669 F. Supp.
85, 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (absent agreement on site, court is powerless to order a venue).
Both Committee Rep., supra note 13, at 256, 259-60, and Washington Foreign Law Society
Rep., supra note 13, at 315, 330, recommend adoption of the Model Law, art. 20, through
federal legislation. See also Kolkey, supra note 13, at 518; Rivkin & Kellner, supra note 8, at
552-53.
38 About a half dozen states would give parties, otherwise bound by an agreement to
arbitrate, the opportunity to restrict the situs of the arbitration if the courts of those states
would have jurisdiction to try the cause of action absent provisions for arbitration. MONT.
CODE ANN. § 27-5-323 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-120 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991)
would void those clauses for all agreements to arbitrate, while four states would void for-
eign situs clauses for specific transactions. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, 1704 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1991) (franchise disclosure legislation); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:1256.1
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beginning arbitral proceedings is established by the request for arbi-
tration, unless the parties agree otherwise, whereas the institutional
rules provide for notice to the sponsoring agency. 39
Although the UNCITRAL Model Law and some states' legisla-
tion require a panel of three arbitrators if the parties do not agree on
the size of the panel, other state statutes specify a sole arbitrator if
the parties have not agreed on a tribunal. All states following the
UNCITRAL Model Law allow persons of any nationality to serve as
an arbitrator, thus following common international practice, particu-
larly when a multimember panel is employed. All state laws allow
court intervention, or intervention by an arbitration institution, to
name arbitrator(s) if a party fails to do so and the demandant peti-
tions the court or institution. In the latter regard, the international
arbitration legislation parallels the Uniform Act and federal statutes.
(West 1989); MICH. CoMP. LAws § 445.1527()(MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 19.854(27)(f) (Calla-
ghan 1990)); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 57:10-7.3(a)(1) (West Supp. 1991) (franchise legislation).
The author chairs a special committee of the North Carolina Bar Association considering
H.1026, a bill modeled on S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-120 (Law Co-op Supp. 1991) and due
for reconsideration in the 1992 North Carolina General Assembly. Such legislation would
appear to be overly restrictive in several contexts. H.1026 could not purport to bar a
plaintiff from the federal courts. Railway Co. v. Whitton's Adm'r, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 270,
286 (1871). Thus if a plaintiff chose to invoke diversity jurisdiction outside North Caro-
lina, the legislation could not be invoked to deter that choice. In the federal courts, all of
the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1988, Supp. 11 1990) would be in force. Nor
could the proposed legislation be construed as barring a sister state's courts from hearing
the claim, perhaps in the mode of an application to control legislation, Hughes v. Fetter,
341 U.S. 609, 610-14 (1951). It would not be a violation of full faith and credit for sister
states to entertain such actions. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 91, re-
porter's note (1971), citing inter alia, Tennessee C., I. & R.R. Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354,
360-61 (1914). See also Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421-24 (1979). The result might be a
race to the courthouse in different states, with the further possibility of reciprocal antisuit
injunctions. See, e.g., Laker Airways v. SABENA, Belgian World Airways, 731 F.2d 909
(D.C. Cir. 1984). In the international arena, the balancing approach of RESTATEMENT OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (THIRD) OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 (1987) might come into
play. Federal courts would be limited by 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1988), the Anti-Injunction Act,
construed in, e.g., Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518 (1986) and Vendo Co.
v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623 (1977); stay provisions of state statutes like N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-75.12 (1983); the federal abstention doctrines, see, e.g., 17A CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§§ 4241-48 (2d ed. 1988); or the similar prior action pending doctrine, see, e.g., Eways v.
Governor's Island, 326 N.C. 552, 391 S.E.2d 182 (1990), might be invoked. The result is
that statutes such as that proposed in H. 1026 may promote rather than decrease litigation,
the latter being a goal of arbitration and a particular desire of foreign parties to interna-
tional arbitrations. As analyzed infra at notes 137-72 and accompanying text, application
of federal statutes or federal common law would practically assure the nullification of state
statutes such as H.1026, particularly in the context of international arbitrations. The
choice of an arbitration site must be reasonable under all the circumstances. Unionmutual
Stock Life Ins. Co. v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 774 F.2d 524, 527 (1st Cir. 1985).
39 Compare UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 21, supra note 8, at 1307; CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 1297.211 (West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-121 (West Supp.
1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.51 (Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.494 (1991); TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 249-21 (West Supp. 1991); with AAA Int'l Arb. R., art. 2, supra
note I1, at 78. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-8(a), 9-9-30 (Michie Supp. 1991) allows the arbitra-
tors to set the time of hearing notwithstanding the parties' choice, the reverse of the policy
of UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 5, 7 U.L.A. 99-100 (1985).
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The court's decision is final and not subject to appeal, according to
some state statutes, a point on which the UNCITRAL Model Law is
silent.40
The UNCITRAL Model Law provisions for challenge of arbitra-
tors, for situations where arbitrators are unable to act, or for substi-
tution of arbitrators, are followed in the state acts, which parallel the
FAA and the Uniform Act in this regard except as to challenging ar-
bitrators, for which no provision is made in the FAA or the UAA.
However, several state statutes add specific statements of what con-
stitutes a conflict as an arbitrator.4' Critics of the UNCITRAL Model
40 Compare UNCITRAL Model Law, arts. 10-11, supra note 8, at 1304-05; CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE §§ 1297.111-1297.118 (West Supp. 1992) (single arbitrator; court decision
final); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50a-1 10-50a-I 1I (West Supp. 1991) (three arbitrators);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.09 (West 1992); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-7, 9-9-30 (Michie Supp.
1991) (court authority to appoint sole or multiple arbitrators); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 658D-
7(b), 658D-7(c) (Supp. 1991) (authority delegated arbitration center to pick arbitrators if
parties do not agree); MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-211 (Michie 1989), 3-28-
07(a)(1) (Michie.Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-567.40-1-567.41 (Supp. 1991) (sole
arbitrator; court decision final); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 36.472, 36.474 (1991); TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN., arts. 249-10-249-11 (West Supp. 1991); with 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1988) and UNIF.
ARBITRATION ACT, § 3, 7 U.L.A. 96 (1985). The Panama Convention, supra note 4, art. 2,
14 I.L.M. 336, provides that arbitrators may be chosen by the parties, and that their ap-
pointment may be delegated to a third person, whether a natural person or a judicial per-
son, e.g., an arbitral institution. Either a national or a foreigner may serve as an arbitrator.
The ICSID Convention, supra note 4, arts. 37-40, 17 U.S.T. 1285-86, 575 U.N.T.S. 184,
allows either one or three arbitrators, a majority of which must be non-nationals of the
parties unless a sole arbitrator has been chosen, permits the President of the World Bank
to choose arbitrators if the panel is not constituted within 90 days and allows arbitrators
that are not listed with ICSID, except for Presidential appointees. Procedure under the
MIGA Convention, supra note 4, is similar. See Annex II: Settlement of Dispute Between a
Member and the Agency Under Article 57, arts. 4(a)-4(c), 24 I.L.M. 1632-33.
41 Compare UNCITRAL Model Law, arts. 12-15, supra note 8, at 1305-06, with CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1297.121-1297.125 (West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 50a-l12-50a-115 (West Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-567.42-1-567.45 (Supp.
1991); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 36.476-36.482 (1991); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN., arts. 249-12-
249.15 (West Supp. 1991). UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT, § 3, 7 U.L.A. 96 (1985) and 9 U.S.C.
§ 5 (1988) are the most terse in these circumstances, the Act allowing court appointment
upon a party's application if an arbitrator "ails or is unable to act and his successor has
not been duly appointed, and 9 U.S.C. § 5 allows court appointment upon a party's appli-
cation if for any . . . reason there shall be a lapse in the naming of an arbitrator .... "
Inclusion of specific statutory conflict of interest rules in the California, North Carolina,
Oregon and Texas legislation supra codifies what is an otherwise confusing picture for
arbitrator ethics. As Robert M. Jarvis in Arbitration Ethics, I FLORIDA BAR, ALTERNATE DIs-
PUTE RESOLUTION IN FLORIDA ch. 13 (1991), notes, there are at least five codes of arbitrator
ethics, two having specific applicability to international arbitrations: AMERICAN ARBITRA-
TION ASSOCIATION-AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN
COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, reprinted in 33 Bus. LAW. 311 (1977); NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBI-
TRATORS, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARBITRATORS OF LABOR-MANAGE-
MENT DISPUTES (1975), reprinted in 28 ANN. PROC. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 217 (1975) and LEO
KANOWITZ, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: CASES AND MATERIALS 994 (1986); INTER-
NATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, ETHICS FOR INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATORS, reprinted in 26 I.L.M.
584 (1987) and 6A BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, supra note 4, Doc. No. 7-12D; SOCIETY OF
MARITIME ARBITRATORS, CODE OF ETHICS, reprinted in 20J. MAR. L. & COM. 273, 286 (1989);
and 6A BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, Doc. No. 7-7A; SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONALS IN DISPUTE
RESOLUTION, ETHICAL STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1987), reprinted in STEVEN
GILLERS & Roy D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 530
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Law note the potential for disruption of the arbitration during the
challenge and the inability of parties to challenge arbitrators under
the FAA,42 where arbitrations must proceed to award before an arbi-
trator can be challenged. However, such commentators do not rec-
ognize the Model Law's provision for continuation of the
proceedings during the challenge, as well as the short time limits for
challenges. Moreover, it would seem that a challenge would be no
more disruptive than the case where a recalcitrant party fails to nom-
inate an arbitrator, and the court must do so, as the Model Law, the
FAA, and the Uniform Act all provide. And while it is true that arbi-
trator ethics require a nominee to disclose conflicts of interest, 43 this
does not cure the situations where an arbitrator may know facts but
does not tell them or the situation where a party perceives possible
bias and the arbitrator does not.
Besides court appointment of arbitrators in default of action by
the parties, the UNCITRAL Model Law also allows the court to
award "interim measures" against any party, including posting se-
curity as the arbitral tribunal may consider necessary, unless the par-
ties have agreed otherwise, 44 or to award such interim measures
"before or during arbitral proceedings." Parties cannot contract out
of this provision. 45 Aside from the New York statute, 46 no state stat-
(1992). Besides these formal sets of rules, there may be occasional reference to arbitrators
in other ethics codes. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.12 (1990); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CODE OF JUDICIAL CON-
DUCT, Canon 4.F (1990). The arbitrators may establish their own rules of ethical behavior
for the proceedings, and courts have upheld such authority. See, e.g., Forsythe Int'l, S.A. v.
Gibbs Oil Co., 915 F.2d 1017, 1022-23 (5th Cir. 1990). The state acts say that arbitrators
may state rules of procedure unless the parties have agreed otherwise. Thus the parties
could agree to application of a set of ethics rules to supplement or supplant legislated
rules, or the arbitrators can do so. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1297.191-1297.193 (West
Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a- 119 (West Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 684.07 (West 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.58 (Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.490
(1991); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 249-19 (West Supp. 1991); UNCITRAL Model Law,
art. 19, supra note 8, at 1307. International arbitrations governed by other legislation may
employ the standard rules, or variations of them, by agreement, by decision of the arbitra-
tion institution, or the arbitral panel. For further reading, see Jarvis, supra. Committee
Rep., supra note 13, at 254-55, would oppose incorporation of the UNCITRAL Model Law,
art. 12-13 procedures for challenging arbitrators, while Washington Foreign Law Society
Rep., supra note 13, at 314-15, 330 advocates adoption of these provisions.
42 Rivkin & Kellner, supra note 8, at 546-47.
43 Id. at 547, citing AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION-AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIA-
TION, CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, Canon II, supra note
41, at 313-15. Query whether this standard would be considered applicable in some inter-
national arbitrations where all arbitrators are non-nationals of the United States, by choice
of the parties, and the arbitration takes place outside the United States. Can U.S. rules
bind the whole world? Cf. Buchanan v. Rucker, 103 Eng. Rep. 546, 547 (K. B. 1808).
44 UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 17, supra note 8, at 1307.
45 Id., art. 9, supra note 8, at 1304.
46 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 7502(c) (McKinney Supp. 1991), enacted in 1985 pur-
portedly to supersede the much-criticized Cooper v. Ateliers de la Motobecane S. A., 57
N.Y.2d 408, 416, 442 N.E.2d 1239, 1243, 450 N.Y.S.2d 728, 732 (1982), which denied
attachment in a New York Convention case. Whether § 7502(c) has achieved its purpose is
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ute governing domestic arbitration has a provision allowing a court
to preserve the status quo by injunctive or other prejudgment proce-
dures designed to protect the integrity of the arbitration. Federal
law is also silent as to this matter, resulting in a division among the
courts as to the availability of interim relief absent statutory author-
ity. 47 The practical result is that a party to an arbitration might se-
crete or remove assets, such that any subsequent award might be
unenforceable.
Three state statutes following the UNCITRAL Model Law copy
the interim measure provisions without much change. 48 Although
four other state acts simply declare that arbitral tribunals may re-
quest interim measures, some statutes are quite particular with lists
of actions courts may take to protect the arbitral process. North Car-
olina's act is typical:
Interim relief and the enforcement of interim measures.
(a) In the case of an arbitration where the arbitrator or arbitra-
tors have not been appointed, or where the arbitrator or arbitrators
are unavailable, a party may seek interim relief directly from the su-
perior court as provided in subsection (c). Enforcement shall be
granted as provided by the law applicable to the type of interim re-
lief sought.
(b) In all other cases, a party shall seek interim measures
under G.S. 1-567.47 from the arbitral tribunal and shall have no
right to seek interim relief from the superior court, except that a
party to an arbitration governed by this Article may request from the
superior court enforcement of an order of an arbitral tribunal grant-
ing interim measures under G.S. 1-567.47.
(c) In connection with an agreement to arbitrate or a pending
arbitration, the superior court may grant, pursuant to subsection (a)
of this section:
questionable. Curtis E. Pew & Robert M.Jarvis, Pre-AwardAttachment in InternationalArbitra-
tion: The Law in New York, 7J. INT'L ARB. 31, 35-40 (1990). See also Mills, supra note 2, at
628-30, 635.
47 Compare, e.g., I.T.A.D. Assocs. v. Podar Bros., 636 F.2d 75, 77 (4th Cir. 1981); Mc-
Creary Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEAT S.P.A., 501 F.2d 1032, 1037-38 (3d Cir. 1974) (pre-
award attachment not available) with Borden, Inc. v. Meiji Milk Prod. Co., 919 F.2d 822,
826 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2259 (1991); E.A.S.T. Inc. v. M/V Alaia, 876 F.2d
1168, 1173 (5th Cir. 1989) (pre-award attachment available). 9 U.S.C. § 8 (1988) allows
pre-award in rem arrest of a vessel in proceedings otherwise governed by arbitration under
the FAA. Charles N. Brower & W. Michael Tupman, Court-Ordered Provisional Measures
Under the New York Convention, 80 AM.J. INT'L L. 24 (1986) submit that courts should grant
pre-award attachments in arbitrations otherwise governed by the New York Convention,
supra note 4, thus joining the courts of the United Kingdom and France in allowing this
procedure. Rivkin & Kellner, supra note 8, at 550-52; Committee Rep., supra note 13, at
256-57, 260, and Washington Foreign Law Society Rep., supra note 13, at 312-14, 330,
recommend the adoption of UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 9, as federal legislation. See also
Kolkey, supra note 13, at 511-13. Mills, supra note 2, at 639-48, advocates enactment of
federal and state legislation to afford interim relief from courts pending completion of
arbitration proceedings.
48 Compare CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1297.91, 1297-171-1297.172 (West Supp. 1992);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50a-109, 50a-1 17 (West Supp. 1991); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-35
(Michie Supp. 1991) with UNCITRAL Model Law, arts. 9, 17, supra note 8, at 1304, 1307.
1992]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
(1) An' order of attachment [or] garnishment;
(2) A temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction;
(3) An order for claim and delivery;
(4) The appointment of a receiver;
(5) Delivery of money or other property into court;
(6) Any other order that may be necessary to ensure the
preservation or availability either of assets or of documents, the
destruction or absence of which would be likely to prejudice the
conduct or effectiveness of the arbitration.
(d) In considering a request for interim relief or the enforce-
ment of interim measures, the court shall give preclusive effect to
any finding of fact of the arbitral tribunal in the proceeding, includ-
ing the probable validity of the claim that is the subject of the in-
terim relief sought or the interim measures granted.
(e) Where the arbitral tribunal has not ruled on an objection
to its jurisdiction, the court shall not grant preclusive effect to the
tribunal's findings until the court has made an independent finding
as to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. If the court rules that
the arbitral tribunal didnot have jurisdiction, the application for in-
terim relief or the enforcement of interim measures shall be denied.
Such a ruling by the court that the arbitral tribunal lacks jurisdiction
is not binding on the arbitral tribunal or subsequent judicial
proceedings.
(0 The availability of interim relief under this section may be
limited by prior written agreement of the parties.4 9
Besides serving as an objective warning as to what awaits the misbe-
having party, state statutes such as those of North Carolina provide
easy incorporation by reference for federal litigation.5 0
The state acts have general provisions, like the Uniform Act and
the FAA, to compel or stay arbitration in other respects. 51
C. The Hearing and Other Proceedings
The UNCITRAL Model Law, and the state statutes following it,
all declare that "parties shall be treated with equality and each party
shall be given a full opportunity of presenting his case," a clause sim-
ilar to the philosophy behind the language in the Uniform Act.5 2
49 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.39 (Supp. 1991); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.47
(Supp. 1991); compare UNCITRAL Model Law, arts. 9, 17, supra note 8, at 1304, 1307 with
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 684.23(3), 684.23(4) (West 1992); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 36-470, 36.486
(1991); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 249-9, 249-17 (West Supp. 1991).
50 FED. R. Civ. P. 64.
51 Compare UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 8, supra note 8, at 1304; CAL. CIv. PROC.
CODE §§ 1297.81-1297.82 (West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-108 (West
Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.22 (West 1992); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-6(a), 9-9-6(b),
9-9-30 (Michie Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.38 (Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 36.468 (1991); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 249-8 (West Supp. 1991); with UNIF. ARBI-
TRATION ACT § 2, 7 U.L.A. 68 (1985) and 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4 (1988).
52 Compare UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 18, supra note 8, at 1307; CAL. CIv. PROC.
CODE § 1297.181 (West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-118 (West Supp.
1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.48 (Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.488 (1991); TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 249-18 (West Supp. 1991) with UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 5(b), 7
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The arbitral tribunal has authority to rule on its jurisdiction, in-
cluding objections to the existence or validity of the arbitration
agreement. The UNCITRAL Model Law separates the arbitration
clause from the contract, such that if the substantive contract is void,
the clause is not void as well. 53 Objections generally can be made at
any time as long as the objection is stated "without undue delay" or
within the contractually-stated time.54 However, jurisdictional ob-
jections must be filed no later than the statement of defense, i.e. the
answer in Federal Rules practice, unless the tribunal considers the
delay justified. Similarly, a claim that the tribunal is exceeding the
scope of its authority must be raised as soon as the issue arises, un-
less the tribunal considers the delay justified. In that respect, inter-
national arbitration practice is more restrictive than the principles
governing federal courts, where subject-matter jurisdiction may be
raised at any time.55 Rulings on jurisdiction or scope of authority
may be given either in a preliminary decision or in an award on the
merits. The losing party has thirty days to petition a trial court for
review of these decisions. There is no appeal from the reviewing
court's ruling. The arbitration can decide the merits while jurisdic-
tion or scope issues are before the court.56 In this regard, the
U.L.A. 100 (1985) ("parties are entitled to be heard, to present evidence material to the
controversy and to cross-examine witnesses at the hearing.")
53 UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 16(1), supra note 8, at 1306; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 1297.161 (West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-116(1) (West Supp. 1991);
GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-34 (Michie Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.46(a) (Supp. 1991);
OR. REV. STAT. § 36.484(1) (1991); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN., art. 249-16, § I (West
Supp. 1991).
54 UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 4, supra note 8, at 1303; CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE
§ 1297.41 (West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-104 (West Supp. 1991); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 1-567.34 (Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.460 (1991); TEX. REV. STAT.
ANN. art. 249-4 (West Supp. 1991).
55 Compare UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 16(2), supra note 8, at 1306; CAL. CIv. PROC.
CODE § 1297.162 (West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a- 116(2) (West Supp.
1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.46(b) (Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.484(2) (1991);
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT ANN. art. 249-16, §§ 2-4 (West Supp. 1991), all of which state that
participation in selection of an arbitrator does not bar such a plea; with, e.g, Louisville & N.
Ry. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) and FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(l), 12(h).
56 Compare UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 16(3), supra note 8, at 1307; CAL. CiV. PROC.
CODE §§ 1297.165-1297.167 (West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a- 116(3)
(West Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.46(c) (Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 36.484(3)-36.484(5) (1991); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 249-16, §§ 5-7 (West Supp.
1991). Both Committee Rep., supra note 13, at 255, 258, and Washington Foreign Law
Society Rep., supra note 13, at 316, opposed the UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 16(3), supra
note 8, at 1307, right of immediate appeal of lack ofjurisdiction on grounds of efficiency.
Given the possibility that a U.S. party may invoke arbitration frivolously, however, the
right of immediate jurisdictional review would protect a foreign party's interests in that the
U.S. party could not force arbitration, and the problem of a suit to enjoin arbitration,
perhaps followed by a counterinjunction suit, might be avoided. See supra note 38. Kolkey,
supra note .13, at 516 (arguing that "the right to seek an early decision on the tribunal's
jurisdiction can be very cost effective.") For those states permitting appeal before final
judgment to test personal jurisdiction, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277(b) (1983), there is a
rough symmetry in the pre-award appeal process for international arbitrations. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-567.46(c) (Supp. 1991) makes abundantly clear for North Carolina-based arbi-
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Model Law follows European practice in arbitrations. 57
The procedure under the Uniform Act and the FAA varies con-
siderably from UNCITRAL Model Law practice on this point. Under
the Uniform Act, a court may stay an arbitration proceeding if it is
shown that there is no agreement to arbitrate, i.e., that there is no
jurisdiction. The FAA also provides for a hearing by the court, with
the possibility of jury trial. Under both the Uniform Act and the
FAA, stay orders may be appealed. Neither legislation states dead-
lines like the 30-day rule under Model Law practice. Thus, the inter-
national arbitration acts allow an initial nisi prius review of
jurisdiction, but no right of further appellate review, as contrasted
with the opportunity for appellate review under the older legislation.
As will be discussed later, full appellate review of such issues can
occur after the award has been rendered. 58 While the UNCITRAL
procedure for initial jurisdiction determination has been criticized as
time-consuming, 59 stay order appeals under the FAA or the Uniform
Act (or perhaps a jury trial) would seem to be even more
burdensome.
The North Carolina Act allows stays of litigation involving a
claim of commitment of the dispute to arbitration, with right of ap-
peal from that decision, thus parallelling the Uniform Act but not the
FAA in this regard. 60 The message of the North Carolina statute is
clear; the preferred route, if a valid arbitration clause is signed, is for
dispute resolution out of court. No other state acts cover the prob-
lem directly, although those jurisdictions incorporating the general
arbitration acts by reference may have such provisions thus
available. 6 1
The UNCITRAL Model Law, the Uniform Act, and the FAA do
not mention the possibility of consolidating several arbitrations.
The state international arbitration acts frequently add such, how-
ever, if the parties agree. Otherwise, if the parties do not agree, the
arbitral tribunal (in Florida) or the court (in California, Georgia,
trations that there is no further appeal until after the final award under N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1-567.67 (Supp. 1991). This eliminates appeal under North Carolina's "substantial
right" doctrine. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-277(a) (1983), 7A-27(d)(l) (1989). The UNCI-
TRAL Model Law, art. 16, supra note 8, at 1306-07, operates analogously to the ICSID
Convention, supra note 4, art. 41, 17 U.S.T. 1286, 575 U.N.T.S. 186, except that there is
no right of appeal from the tribunal's decision. See also ICSID Arb. R. 41, in INTERNA-
TIONAL CENTRE FOR INVESTMENT DISPUTES 80-81 (Jan. 1985). The MIGA Convention, supra
note 4, procedure is similar to that under the ICSID Convention. Annex II: Settlement of
Dispute Between a Member and the Agency Under Rule 57, art. 4(f), 24 I.L.M. 1633.
57 Rivkin & Kellner, supra note 8, at 547-48.
58 See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
59 Rivkin & Kellner supra note 8, at 547-48; but see Kolkey, supra note 13, at 514.
60 Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.38 (Supp. 1991) with Unif. Arb. Act §§ 2,
19(a)(l), 19(a)(2), 7 U.L.A. 68-69, 216-17 (1985) and 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 16(a)(I), 16(b)(1)
(1988, Supp. 11 1990).
61 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-6(a), 9-9-16, 9-9-30, 9-9-43(1) (Michie Supp. 1991).
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North Carolina, Oregon, and Texas) can order consolidation.6 2
These provisions answer a criticism of the UNCITRAL Model Law.63
The UNCITRAL Model Law allows parties to craft their own
rules of procedure, subject to the provisions of the legislation, to be
followed by the arbitral tribunal. Although the Model Law does not
so state, the parties may simply adopt by reference the procedure of
arbitration institutions, such as the AAA international arbitration
rules. At least one state, North Carolina, has declared that parties
may explicitly opt out of the legislation. If there is no agreement on
procedure, the arbitral tribunal may, subject to the legislation, "con-
duct the arbitration in such a manner as it considers appropriate."
This includes the power to determine admissibility, relevance, mate-
riality, and weight of any evidence. The North Carolina Act cau-
tiously provides that evidence is not limited by the rules of evidence
applicable in judicial proceedings, except as to immunities and privi-
leges, and further declares that each party has the burden of proof as
to facts supporting claims, setoffs, or defenses. 64 Neither the Uni-
form Act nor the FAA have comparable provisions, although institu-
tional authorities' rules may fill some gaps. 65
62 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1297.272-1297.273 (West Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 684.12 (West 1990); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-6(e)-9-9-6(h), 9-9-30 (Michie Supp. 1991);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.57(b) (Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 36.506(2)-36.506(3)
(1991); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 249-27, §§ 2-3 (West Supp. 1991). A majority of the
U.S. Courts of Appeals have held that arbitrations cannot be consolidated under the FAA.
Compare Baesler v. Continental Grain Co., 900 F.2d 1193, 1194-95 (8th Cir. 1990)(consoli-
dation not allowed, collecting cases) with Compania Espanola de Petroleos S.A. v. Nereus
Shipping S.A., 527 F.2d 966, 974-75 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 906 (1976) (con-
solidation allowed). If state law allows consolidation, or if the parties insert a clause for
such in the contract, consolidation will be ordered. New England Energy, Inc. v. Keystone
Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1, 3-8 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989); Gavlik
Constr. Co. v. H. F. Campbell Co., 526 F.2d 777, 787-89 (3d Cir. 1975). Thus application
of the state acts' consolidation provisions, either with the federal statutes, as purely state
law, or as rules adopted by the parties, will aid in more efficient prosecution of arbitra-
tions. See also Mellman, supra note 2, at 381-82, and infra notes 163-74 and accompanying
text.
63 Rivkin & Kellner, supra note 8, at 558.J. Gillis Wetter, The Proper Scope of a National
Arbitration Act, 5 INT'L ARB. REP. 17, 21-23 (No. 10, 1990) lists numerous omissions in the
UNCITRAL Model Law but notes that other national statutes (e.g., Switzerland's) may
have significant gaps too.
64 Compare UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 19, supra note 8, at 1307, with CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §§ 1297.191-1297.193 (West Supp. 1992 ); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a- 119 (West
Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.15(1) (West 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-56 7 .31(g), 1-
567.49 (Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.490 (1991); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 249-
19 (West Supp. 1991). North Carolina's version references the rules of evidence as used
in judicial proceedings and the exclusions for immunities and privilege similar to N.C. CT.-
ORDERED ARB. R. 3(h); see also M.D.N.C.R. 606(g). The ICSID Convention, supra note 4,
art. 44, 17 U.S.T. 1287, 575 U.N.T.S. 186, also allows parties to choose their own proce-
dural rules, in the absence of which the current ICSID rules will apply. For the latter, see
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR INVESTMENT DISPUTES, supra note 56, at 61-89. For the range
of possibilities where arbitration procedure rules are not specified by parties' choice or
operation of law, see Vitek Danilowicz, The Choice of Applicable Law in International Arbitration,
9 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 235, 238-58 (1986).
65 See, e.g., AAA Int'l Arb. R., art. 16(1), supra note 11, at 80.
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Unlike domestic arbitration legislation, state statutes following
the UNCITRAL Model Law provide for the language(s) to be used
during the arbitration and the parties may agree on such. However, if
there is no agreement, the tribunal may choose which language ap-
plies to both oral and written aspects of the proceedings. The tribu-
nal may also direct that documentary evidence be accompanied by
translations into the agreed or ordered language(s). The North Car-
olina Act adds that the tribunal may employ translators at the parties'
expense, thereby minimizing the possible situation where the parties'
translations might be suspect.6 6
The UNCITRAL Model Law has provisions akin to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and institutional arbitration rules for ex-
change of statements of claim, defenses, and amendments or supple-
mentary statements. 6 7 Surprisingly, many of the state international
arbitration acts lack explicit provisions stating that the parties are
entitled to representation by counsel, unlike the Uniform Act and
institutional rules.68 This omission is not a serious defect, since
other legislation and case law may declare that parties are entitled to
representation by counsel in proceedings within a state.6 9 Parties
concerned about the statutory omission should insert a clause in
contracts to that effect.
70
66 Compare UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 22, supra note 8, at 1307-08; CAL. CIv. PROC.
CODE §§ 1297.221-1297.224 (West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-1 22 (West
Supp. 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-37 (Michie Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.52
(Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.496 (1991); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 249-22
(West Supp. 1991) with AAA Int'l Arb. R., art. 14, supra note 11, at 80.
67 Compare UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 23, supra note 8, at 1308; CAL. CIv. PROC.
CODE §§ 1297.231-1297.233 (West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-123 (West
Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.53 (Supp. 1991), which adds a provision for pro-
ceedings involving more than two parties; OR. REV. STAT. § 36.498 (1991); TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 249-23 (West Supp. 1991) with AAA Rules, arts. 2, 3, 17, supra note 11 at
78-80; FED. R. CIv. P. 7(a), 8-10, 12(a)-12(b), 13(a)-13(b), 15.
68 Only FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.14 (West 1992) and GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-8(c), 9-9-30
(Michie Supp. 1991) explicitly authorize representation by counsel, although the conflict
of interest statements in CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1297.121(b), 1297.121(e)(ii),
1297.121(f)(ii) (West Supp. 1992) and OR. REV. STAT. § 36.476(l)(b), 36.476(1)(e)(B),
36.476(1)(f)(B) (1991) imply that lawyers can represent parties. But see, UNIF. ARBITRATION
ACT § 6, 7 U.L.A. 113 (1985); AAA Int'l Arb. R., art. 12, supra note I1, at 80 ("Any party
may be represented."). The drafters of the UNCITRAL Model Law were in "general
agreement that parties may be represented by persons of their choice .... The prevailing
view was that there was no real need to express such a principle, which seemed to be
widely recognized." First Working Group Report, $ 70, U.N.Doc. A/CN.9/216 (Mar. 23,
1982), reprinted in HOLTZMANN & NEUHAUS, supra note 8, at 1158.
69 The states commonly provide for appointment of counsel to represent indigents,
e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-110 (1983), or may forbid certain entities, e.g., corporations ex-
cept for law school legal clinics or Legal Services Corporation offices, from practicing law,
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-474.1-7A.474.5 (1989, 1991 Cum. Supp.), 84-5-84-9 (1985), leav-
ing the inference that other parties in arbitration may choose a lawyer to represent them.
70 The UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 18, supra note 8, at 1307, adopted by California,
Connecticut, North Carolina, Oregon and Texas, supra note 52, in providing for treating
parties with equality, also declares that "each party shall be given full opportunity of
presenting his case." "Full opportunity of presenting [a] case" should be interpreted to
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Defaults in submissions and presentations of evidence are gov-
erned by procedures similar to those in institutional arbitration.
Claimants failing to communicate statements of claim suffer termina-
tion of the proceedings, a result analogous to plaintiffs not filing
amended complaints after a successful motion to dismiss in Federal
Rules practice. Unlike default practice in litigation, however, the ar-
bitral tribunal must continue the proceeding to award if the respon-
dent, i.e. the defendant in civil practice, does not communicate a
statement of defense. Failure to file a defense is not an admission of
the claimant's allegations. There is no equivalent of summary judg-
ment or directed verdict if the arbitration goes to hearing; rather, the
tribunal makes an award on the available evidence. 7 1
The traditional procedure in arbitration has been for curtail-
ment of the relatively freewheeling use of discovery as practiced in
civil litigation. Courts have stated that discovery, in the style of liti-
gation, is not favored because parties agreeing to arbitrate are
deemed to have substituted the relatively low cost of arbitration for
the potential of greater expense in discovery. 72 The general notion
is that arbitrators will sift all evidence presented for admissibility,
relevancy, materiality, and weight without the normal strictures of
the evidence rules. 73 However, domestic arbitration legislation, such
as the Uniform Act or the FAA, do have provisions for compelling
witnesses to testify and for the production of documents and other
materials. 74 On the other hand, arbitration rules have permitted dis-
covery. 75 Perhaps reflective of other nations' aversion to U.S. dis-
allow parties to employ persons, e.g., attorneys, to develop their cases fully. See First Work-
ing Group Report, supra note 68.
71 Compare UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 25, supra note 8, at 1308; CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §§ 1257.251-1297.253 (West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-125 (West
Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.13(6) (West 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.55 (Supp.
1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.502 (1991); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 249-25 (West Supp.
1991); AAA Int'l Arb. R., art. 24, supra note 11, at 81, which omits a provision for a claim-
ant who fails to file a notice of claim, because AAA Int'l Arb. R., art. 2, supra note 11, at 78,
requires the statement of claim as part of the notice to the administrator, without which
the arbitration cannot begin; ICSID Convention, supra note 4, art. 45(2), 17 U.S.T. 1287,
575 U.N.T.S. 188; ICSID Arb. R. 42, 44-45, supra note 56, at 81-82; with FED. R. Civ. P.
12(b), 50, 55, 56. The term "directed verdict" has been replaced by the phrase "judgment
as a matter of law" in FED. R. Civ. P. 50. The procedure for defaults in arbitration has
been followed in court-ordered arbitration. See, e.g., N.C. CT.-ORD. ARN. R. 3(j). The
UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 5(a), 7 U.L.A. 99-100 (1985), has a similar provision.
72 United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Corp., 597 P.2d 290, 302 (N.M.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 911 (1979); M. DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 27:01 (G.
Wilner rev. ed. 1984). Michael F. Hoellering, Scope of Documentary Discovery in U.S. and Inter-
nationalArbitration, 3 WORLD ARB. & MED. REP 46, 49 (No. 2, 1992) notes the importance of
choosing the right arbitrator(s), who have the discretion to shape the scope and extent of
discovery.
73 UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 7, 7 U.L.A. 114 (1985); 9 U.S.C. § 7 (1988).
7, See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
75 AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, R. 41, 42,
45 (1986); PRIVATE ADJUDICATION CENTER, INC., INFORMATION BOOKLET, R. 5.01 (1991).
The ICSID Convention, art. 43, supra note 4, permits the tribunal to call upon parties to
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covery practices, most state acts copying the UNCITRAL Model Law
follow the philosophy of the Uniform Act and the FAA 76 in providing
for compelling production for use only before the tribunal. A two-
stage compulsion procedure is contemplated: initial orders are
made by the arbitrators, followed by resort to the courts if a party is
recalcitrant. The North Carolina Act explicitly tailors its version to
state legislation, with the specific possibility of sanctions for noncom-
pliance.7 7 In this regard, the Rules follow case law, which allows ar-
bitrator interim measures, at least in New York. 78 The North
Carolina version answers one criticism of omissions in the UNCI-
TRAL Model Law. 79
Unless the parties have agreed otherwise, the arbitral tribunal
decides whether to hold oral hearings or to decide the case on the
basis of documents and other materials. The parties must be given
sufficient advance notice of hearings and of meetings of the tribunal
to inspect documents, property, etc. The parties must exchange
statements, documents or other material upon which they expect to
rely, and they must receive expert reports on other evidentiary docu-
ments. Some state acts also declare deadlines for document ex-
change and provide that hearings will be private, which are common
features of institutional arbitration rules. The North Carolina Act
also provides for confidentiality of all aspects of the arbitration pro-
ceedings unless the parties agree otherwise or applicable law re-
quires disclosure. In addition, the North Carolina statute suggests
that parties may agree on a court reporter, a transcript, or an audio
or video record at their expense; the Georgia Code requires the arbi-
trators to keep a record, perhaps by court reporter. The party that
pays in Georgia arbitrations is less than clear.80 Presumably, the tri-
produce documents or other evidence, and ICSID Arb. R. 35, supra note 56, at 77-78 de-
clares that the parties shall cooperate with the tribunal in producing evidence, and that the
tribunal shall "take formal note" of a party's failure to comply.
76 See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
77 Compare UNCITRAL Model Law, arts. 17, 27, supra note 8, at 1307, 1309, with CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1297.171-1297.172, 1297.271 (West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 50a-117, 50a-127 (West Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.16 (West 1991); GA.
CODE ANN. § 9-9-35 (Michie Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-567.47, 1-567.57(a)
(Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 36.486, 36.506(1) (1991); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. arts. 249-
17, 249-27 § 1 (West Supp. 1991). Committee Rep., supra note 13, at 156-57 was critical
of the UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 17, and Washington Foreign Law Society, supra note
13, at 316-17, and felt that existing law and practice were adequate for giving arbitrators
authority to order interim measures.
78 Park City Assocs. v. Total Energy Leasing Corp., 58 A.D.2d 786, 787 (N.Y. 1977).
Institutional arbitration rules commonly have such provisions. See, e.g., AAA Int'l Arb. R.,
art. 22, supra note 11, at 81.
79 See Rivkin & Kellner, supra note 8, at 558, which is critical of UNCITRAL Model
Law, art. 27. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
80 Compare UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 24, supra note 8, at 1308; with CAL. CIv. PROC.
CODE §§ 1297.241-1297.242 (West Supp. 1992) (adding provision for in camera hearings
or meetings unless parties agree otherwise); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-124 (West
Supp. 199 1); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.13(1) (West 1992) (allows a party to request or a tribu-
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bunal would direct the parties to share costs.
Consistent with the Uniform Act and the FAA, the state interna-
tional arbitration acts provide for court assistance in obtaining evi-
dence, such as by subpoenaing witnesses or persons with custody of
documents or other materials. Unlike earlier legislation, the acts al-
low parties to request judicial assistance if the arbitral tribunal ap-
proves. 81 As is the practice under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
civil law, or institutional arbitration rules, arbitral tribunals may ap-
point experts to report on specific issues. The parties may be re-
quired to give the expert information or to provide access to
documents located on other property for inspection. Unless other-
wise agreed, the parties can request, or the arbitral tribunal can di-
rect, the expert to submit to cross-examination by the parties, who
additionally can offer rebuttal expert testimony. 82
The parties' choice of law in the agreement to arbitrate must be
honored by the tribunal. Unless the agreement to arbitrate states
otherwise, choice of law refers to the substantive law of the jurisdic-
tion(s) and not to choice of law rules. If the parties do not state
choice(s) of law, "the ... tribunal shall apply the law determined by
the conflict of laws rules . . . it considers applicable." Unless ex-
pressly authorized to do so, the tribunal may not make an award ex
aequo et bono, i.e. on the basis of fundamental fairness, or as amiable
compositeur, i.e. as an amicable compounder, the occasional practice
outside the United States. In this regard the acts mirror principles
adopted by institutional arbitration rules, except that the UNCI-
TRAL Model Law and several statutes add a requirement that the
nal to decide to hold hearings; filing deadlines stated); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-68, 9-9-30
(Michie Supp. 1991) (hearing in discretion of arbitrators); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.54
(Supp. 1991) (arbitral tribunal must establish filing deadlines; unless otherwise agreed,
hearings are private; provision for recording hearings); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.500 (Supp.
1991); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 249-24 (West Supp. 1991). ICSID Arb. R. 32, 34-37
supra note 56, at 77-79, contemplates oral hearings, visits and views, as well as use of
depositions and special examination of witnesses.
81 Compare UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 27, supra note 8, at 1309; CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 1297.271 (West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-127 (West Supp.
1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.23(2) (West 1992) (also allows letters rogatory or other for-
eign judicial assistance); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-9, 9-9-30 (Michie Supp. 1991); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 658D-8 (Supp. 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.57(a) (Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 36.506(1) (1991); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 249-27 § 1 (West Supp. 1991) with
UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 7, 7 U.L.A. 114 (1985) and 9 U.S.C. § 7 (1988).
82 Compare UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 26, supra note 8, at 1309; CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §§ 1297.261-1297.262 (West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-126 (West
Supp. 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-38 (Michie Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.56
(Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.504 (Supp. 1991); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art 249-26
(West Supp. 1991) with FED. R. EvID. 706; Kolkey, supra note 13, at 521, citing UNCITRAL
Report Excerpts on the Model Law, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17), ch. II, at 5-56,
U.N.Doc. A/40/17 (1985), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1314, 1348 (1988) and HOLTZMANN &
NEUHAUS, supra note 8, at 731, 732; and AAA Int'l Arb. R., art. 23, supra note Ii, at 81.
Despite the obvious parallel with the federal evidence rules, Washington Foreign Law So-
ciety Rep., supra note 13, at 317, opposed enactment of article 26 as federal law.
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tribunal must "take into account the usage of the trade applicable to
the transaction," which may be at variance with the law chosen by the
parties.83
Whether an agreement is governed by the state acts, or is sub-
ject to federal law, the choice of law is a fundamental decision that
should be stated in every agreement.8 4 Otherwise, an international
arbitral tribunal may apply its own notions of what law to apply, per-
haps using different law for different parts of a transaction under the
conflicts rules of the place where the tribunal sits. The state acts give
the parties a free choice in this important aspect of the transaction,
and it is an option that should be crystallized in a well-drafted choice
of law clause.
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, a multimember arbitral
panel decides substantive issues by majority vote. Procedural ques-
tions may be decided by the presiding arbitrator if the parties agree
or if all tribunal members so agree. This provision is common in
institutional arbitration rules.8 5
83 Compare UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 28, supra note 8, at 1309; CAL. CIv. PROC.
CODE §§ 1297.281-1297.285 (West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-128 (West
Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.17 (West 1992), which allows for the application of
"equitable principles" if the tribunal is faced with a choice of law decision; N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 1-567.58 (Supp. 1991) (defining terms); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.508 (1991); TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 249-28 (West Supp. 1991) with AAA Int'l Arb. R., art. 29, supra note 11, at
82. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-36 (Michie Supp. 1991) recites that selection of Georgia does
not ipsofacto mean choosing Georgia procedural or substantive law as the law governing
the arbitration, thereby giving arbitrators even less guidance than the UNCITRAL Model
Law if the parties do not insert a choice of law clause. The ICSID Convention, supra note
4, art. 42, 17 U.S.T. 1286-87, 575 U.N.T.S. 186, allows the parties to choose the substan-
tive law rules applicable to the dispute. In the absence of such rules the tribunal applies
the law of the Contracting State, including its conflicts principles, "and such rules of inter-
national law as may be applicable." Id. The tribunal may also apply ex aequo et bono princi-
ples if parties agree to such. Choice of law under the MIGA Convention, supra note 4, is
similar. Annex 11: Settlement of Disputes Between a Member and the Agency Under Arti-
cle 57, art. 4 (g), 24 I.L.M. 1633. Article 38(2) of the I.C.J. statute, would permit ex aequo et
bono treatment, but only if the parties agree to such. Committee Rep., supra note 13, at
257-58, recommends against the adoption of the Model Law, art. 28, supra note 8, at 1309,
while Washington Foreign Law Society Rep., supra note 13, at 315-16, 330, advocates fed-
eral legislation covering the substance of art. 28. Resolving a case on ex aequo et bono or
amiable compositeur principles would mean "deciding the merits of the dispute in the manner
that the tribunal deems just, without necessarily reaching the decision that would have
been mandated by applicable principles of law and equity." Loumiet et al., supra note 2, at
634.
84 For an analysis of the process of decision if there is no choice of law clause, see
Danilowicz, supra note 64, at 258-82. The variety of approaches taken by tribunals, per-
haps to the complete surprise of parties, underscores the importance of such a clause.
85 Compare UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 29, supra note 8, at 1309; CAL. Civ. PROC.
CODE § 1297.291 (West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-129 (West Supp.
1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.11 (West 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.59 (Supp. 1991);
OR. REV. STAT. § 36.510 (1991); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 249-29 (West Supp. 1991)
with AAA Int'l Arb. R., art. 27, supra note 11, at 81.
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D. Ending the Arbitral Proceedings
As in traditional litigation, parties can agree to settle claims at
any time without any record of the terms. If they request, and the
tribunal does not object, the settlement may be recorded as an
award, which has the same form, status, and effect as an award by the
tribunal. The California, Oregon, and Texas acts add that an arbitral
tribunal may encourage settlement of the dispute and may use other
alternative dispute resolution methods, such as mediation or concili-
ation, if the parties agree to such.8 6 Thus, an award that records a
settlement can operate like a judgment that records a settlement or
confession of liability, if the award is converted into a judgment for
enforcement purposes.
Requirements for a valid award are similar to those of the Uni-
form Act. The award must be in writing, must be signed by the arbi-
trator(s) giving the award, and must be delivered to each party. The
international arbitration statutes also require that reasons for non-
signature by arbitrators be stated and that the award include the date
and place of arbitration. In a reversal of policy from the Uniform Act
and the FAA, most statutes follow the UNCITRAL Model Law re-
quirement that the tribunal deliver a reasoned award unless the par-
ties agree otherwise. State statutes also commonly provide for
interim or partial awards, interest computation, and costs, including
attorney fees, and thereby follow provisions in institutional arbitra-
tion rules. The UNCITRAL Model Law does not require that the
award remain private, but some state acts so provide. The North
Carolina Act, following institutional rules, declares that the award
can be made in foreign currency. Specific performance can be
awarded upon a party's request. 8 7
86 Compare UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 30, supra note 8, at 1309-10; CAL. CIv. PROC.
CODE § 1297.301 (West Supp. 1992); 1989 Conn. Acts 89-79 § 30 (Reg. Sess.); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-567.60 (Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.512 (1991); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 249-30 (West Supp. 1991) with AAA Int'l Arb. R., art. 30(1), supra note 11, at 82.
ICSID Arb. R. 43, supra note 56, at 81-82, also includes settlement provisions.
87 Compare UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 31, supra note 8, at 1310; with CAL. CIv. PROC.
CODE §§ 1297.311-1297.318 (West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-131 (West
Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 684.18-684.19 (West 1992) (no reasoned award necessary
unless parties agree to such or tribunal determines that failure to do-so would prejudice
recognition or enforcement of the award; privacy of the award required unless all parties
consent or such is required by law); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-10, 9-9-39 (Michie Supp. 1991)
(no reasoned award unless parties agree to such, or tribunal determines that failure to do
so would prejudice recognition or enforcement of the award); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-
567.54(d), 1-567.61 (Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.514 (1991); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 249-31 (West Supp. 1991); UNIF. ARBITRATION AcT § 8(a), 7 U.L.A. 116 (1985);
AAA Int'l Arb. R., arts. 28, 32, supra note 11, at 82; see also ICSID Arb. R. 46-49, supra note
56, at 82-84. Provisions for attorneys fees as part of the costs in an award is common in
international practice but is a significant departure from customary U.S. practice. Parties
not wanting fee-shifting should include a contract provision to that effect. Garvey & Hef-
felfinger, supra note 2, at 220; Golbert & Kolkey, supra note 2, at 588; Loumiet et al., supra
note 2, at 636.
19921
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Commentators criticize the requirement for a reasoned award,
stating that it is better to leave this decision to the arbitrators, who
may choose not to elaborate on their decision, and argue that a rea-
soned award may promote further litigation in some cases. These
critics do admit that a reasoned decision is given in "most awards."88
These commentators' arguments appear to overlook the current re-
quirements of institution-governed arbitration, and there is the addi-
tional observation that requiring a reasoned award "provides an
additional discipline and restraint on arbitrary decisions." Since the
chances of overturning an award on appeal are relatively slight, this
can be an additional comforting factor in international arbitrations.8 9
Arbitrations are considered ended when the tribunal reaches its
final award, according to the UNCITRAL Model Law. The proceed-
ings can terminate if the claim is withdrawn, if the parties agree on
termination, or if "the arbitral tribunal finds that the continuation of
the proceedings has for any other reason become unnecessary or im-
possible." Except for the possibility of correcting, explaining, or set-
ting aside the award, the tribunal's mandate ends with termination of
the proceedings. These terms also appear in institutional rules. 90
E. Modifying or Setting Aside the Award
UNCITRAL-based legislation contemplates the same two-stage
procedure for altering the award as found in the Uniform Act and
institutional arbitration rules. Some statutes, e.g. those of Georgia,
depart from the language of the Model Law and are tailored after the
Uniform Act.
The arbitral tribunal has the first opportunity to change its
award. It may do so, upon application of a party or on its initiative,
to correct typographical, computation, or clerical errors, within 30
days or a time agreed by the parties. If the parties agree, the tribunal
can give an interpretation of a specific point or part of the award,
which then becomes part of the award. The tribunal must complete
these tasks within 30 days of receipt of the request. The tribunal also
has authority to make additional awards for claims considered but
omitted from the award when requested by a party, unless the parties
have agreed otherwise, upon notice to all parties. The tribunal may
extend its time deadline for making corrections, interpretations, or
additional awards. 9'
88 Rivkin & Kellner, supra note 8, at 548.
89 Kolkey, supra note 13, at 522.
90 Compare UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 32, supra note 8, at 1310; CAL. CIv. PROC.
CODE §§ 1297.321-1297.323 (West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-132 (West
Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.62 (Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 36-516 (1991);
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 249-32 (West Supp. 1991) with AAA Int'l Arb. R., art. 30,
supra note !1, at 82. See also, ICSID Arb. R. 44, supra note 56, at 82.
91 Compare UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 33, supra note 8, at 1310-11; CAL. CIv. PROC.
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The second stage for modifying or setting aside the award in-
volves action by a court. Here, the state statutes tend to parallel the
Uniform Act and federal legislation as well as the UNCITRAL Model
Law, which provides:
An arbitral award may be set aside by the court ... only if:
(a) the party making the application furnishes proof that:
(i) a party to the arbitration agreement referred to in article
7 was under some incapacity; or the said agreement is not
valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it
or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of this
State; or
(ii) the party making the application was not given proper no-
tice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral
proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case;
or
(iii) the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not
falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration,
or contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the
submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions
on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from
those not so submitted, only that part of the award which
contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration
may be set aside; or
(iv) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of
the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a
provision of this Law from which the parties cannot dero-
gate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance
with this Law; or
(b) the court finds that:
(i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settle-
ment by arbitration under the law of this State; or
(ii) the award is in conflict with the public policy of this State.
These are the exclusive reasons for setting aside an award. Parties
are given three months for set-aside motions. The court may, when
appropriate and when requested by a party, suspend the set-aside
proceeding to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to eliminate
the problem. 9 2 Several states follow this formula. 93 North Carolina
employs language that blends the Model Law and the Uniform Act, 9 4
CODE §§ 1297.331-1297.337 (West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-133 (West
Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.20 (West 1992) (parties' application the only means
for changing award; provision for additional hearings); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-11, 9-9-30,
9-9-39(b) (Michie Supp. 1991) (different time deadlines); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.63
(Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.518 (1991); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 249-33
(West Supp. 1991) with UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 9, 7 U.L.A. 128 (1985) and AAA Int'l
Arb. R., art. 31, supra note 11, at 82
92 UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 34, supra note 8, at 1311-12. Cf UNIF. ARBITRATION
ACT §§ 12-13, 7 U.L.A. 140-41, 201-02 (1985); 9 U.S.C. § 10-11 (1988, Supp. 11 1990).
93 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-134 (West Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN.§§ 684.24(1)(b), 684.25 (West 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.520 (1991).
94 Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.64 (Supp. 1991) with UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT§§ 12-13, 7 U.L.A. 140-41, 201-02 (1985).
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while other statutes would have parties rely on the Uniform Act or
general arbitration legislation. 95
F. Recognition and Enforcement of Awards: Appeals
The recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards within the
United States is a relatively simple matter. Both the Uniform Act and
the FAA provide that a party may apply to the court for an order
confirming an award. When the order confirming the award is
granted, perhaps after rulings on motions to vacate, modify, or cor-
rect the award, a judgment or decree in conformity with the award
will be entered. Such ajudgment or decree can then be enforced like
any other judgment or decree. 96 The international arbitration legis-
lation operates either directly, 97 or through application of the state's
general arbitration statute,98 to provide for such conversions. In
some instances the state acts also provide for enforcement of awards
rendered outside the state; to that extent the acts reiterate the
pledges of federal statutes implementing the Conventions, but for-
eign awards from non-Convention nations would also be included. 99
95 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1285-88.8 (West 1982); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-13, 9-9-14,
9-9-30 (Michie Supp. 1991); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 658-9-658-11 (Supp. 1991); MD. CTS. &
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-222-3-225 (1989 Repl.); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 237
(West 1973). The ICSID Convention, art. 52, supra note 4, 17 U.S.T. 1290, 575 U.N.T.S.
192, and ICSID Arb. R. 50-52, supra note 56, at 85-87 have an annulment procedure that
questions the continuing viability of ICSID arbitration because of the uncertain finality of
ICSID awards. See Christopher M. Koa, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment and Dispute Resolution: Conciliating and Arbitrating with China Through the International Cen-
tre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 24 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 501, 526-40 (1992).
Awards under the MIGA Convention, supra note 4, are "final and binding upon the parties
and [are] not subject to appeal, annulment or revision." Any disputes as to the scope or
meaning of an award must be resolved by the arbitrators, who must be reconvened, or a
new arbitral tribunal. Annex II: Settlement of Disputes Between a Member and the
Agency Under Article 57, arts -4(h)-4(i), 24 I.L.M. 1633.
96 The FAA imposes a one-year limitation on applying for confirmation, and both the
Uniform Act and the FAA impose time limits on motions to vacate, modify or correct.
UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT §§ 11-15, 7 U.L.A. 133, 140-41, 201-02, 204, 208 (1985); 9 U.S.C.§§ 9-13 (1988; Supp. 11 1990).
97 Compare 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-13 (1988; Supp. 11 1990) and UNCITRAL Model Law, art.
35, supra note 8, at 1312, with CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-135 (West Supp. 1991); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 684.24(1), 684.27, 684.28 (West 1992); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-13, 9-9-42
(Michie Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.65 (Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.522
(1991).
98 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1285, 1287.4 (West 1982); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 658-12-
658.14 (1985 Repl.), 658D-9 (Supp. 1990); MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-227-3-
228 (1989 Repl.); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 238-1 (West 1973).
99 Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-135 (West Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 684.24(1), 684.27, 684.28 (West 1992); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-40, 9-9-41 (Michie
Supp. 1991); HAW. REV. STAT. § 658D-9 (Supp. 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.65 (Supp.
1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.522 (1991) with 9 U.S.C. § 207 (1988), implementing New
York Convention, supra note 4, arts. 3-4, 21 U.S.T. 2519-20, 330 U.N.T.S. 40; 9 U.S.C.
§§ 301-02 (Supp. II 1990), implementing Panama Convention, art. 4, supra note 4, 14
I.L.M. 337; 22 U.S.C. § 1650a (1988), implementing ICSID Convention, supra note 4, art.
54, 17 U.S.T. 1291-92, 575 U.N.T.S. 194.22 U.S.C. § 290k-II (1988), implementing the
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Some state statutes include grounds for refusal of enforcement,
taken from the UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 36:
(1) Recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award, irrespective
of the country in which it was made, may be refused only:
(a) at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, if
that party furnishes to the competent court where recogni-
tion or enforcement is sought proof that:
(i) a party to the arbitration agreement referred to in
article 7 was under some incapacity; or the said
agreement is not valid under the law to which the
parties have subjected it or, failing any indication
thereon, under the law of the country where the
award was made; or
(ii) the party against whom the award is invoked was not
given proper notice of the appointment of an arbi-
trator or of the arbitral proceedings or was other-
wise unable to present his case; or
(iii) the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by
or not falling within the terms of the submission to
arbitrate, or it contains decisions on matters beyond
the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided
that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitra-
tion can be separated from those not so submitted,
that part of the award which contains decisions on
matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized
and enforced; or
(iv) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbi-
tral procedure was not in accordance with the agree-
ment of the parties or, failing such agreement, was
not in accordance with the law of the country where
the arbitration took place; or
(v) the award has not yet become binding on the parties
or has been set aside or suspended by a court of the
country in which, or under the law of which, that
award was made; or
(b) if the court finds that:
(i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of
settlement by arbitration under the law of this State;
or
(ii) the recognition or enforcement of the award would
be contrary to the public policy of this State.
(2) If an application for setting aside or suspension of an award has been
made to a court referred to in paragraph (1) (a) (v) of this article, the
court where recognition or enforcement is sought may, if it considers
it proper, adjourn its decision and may also, on the application of the
party claiming recognition or enforcement of the award, order the
other party to provide appropriate security.
These parallel grounds are listed in the Conventions or U.S. imple-
menting legislation. 0 0 All state acts, except those of Florida, Mary-
MIGA Convention, supra note 4, Annex II: Settlement of Disputes Between a Member and
the Agency Under Article 57, art. 4(j), 24 I.L.M. 1633.
too California, Maryland and Texas have no comparable provisions. Compare UNCI-
TRAL Model Law, art. 36, supra note 8, at 1312-13, with CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-136
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land, and North Carolina, rely on general arbitration legislation to
trace routes of appeal.' 0 '
Once an award is final, the Full Faith and Credit Act 10 2 can then
be employed to enforce the judgment throughout the United States.
The Uniform Act has a special provision for appeals from ajudgment
or decree on an award, while federal court judgments must be ap-
pealed pursuant to the final judgment statute.'0 3
The full faith and credit principles stated above apply to any ar-
bitral award reduced to judgment in the United States. The arbitra-
tion of international transactions involves four different problems:
1. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award rendered
outside the United States;
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award rendered in
the United States that is taken outside the United States for rec-
ognition and enforcement;
3. Recognition and enforcement of a foreign-nation judgment on
an arbitral award rendered outside the United States;
4. Recognition and enforcement of a judgment on an arbitral
award rendered within the United States that is taken outside
the United States for recognition and enforcement.
The first and second situations, involving arbitral award recogni-
tion and enforcement, are the subject of the ICSID, MIGA, New
York, and Panama Conventions,' 0 4 and are already applicable for
the United States and other nations party to them. The state interna-
tional arbitration acts can only cover the first situation for the partic-
ular state and are subject to Supremacy Clause primacy' 0 5 for those
arbitrations covered by the Conventions. Neither the third nor
(West Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.25 (West 1992); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-9-13, 9-9-
42 (Michie Supp. 1991) (grounds for declining to recognize largely based on general arbi-
tration statute, on Georgia "public policy" and upon condition of reciprocity); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 658D-9 (Supp. 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.64 (Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 36.524 (1991); with 9 U.S.C. § 10 (Supp. 11 1990); 9 U.S.C. §§ 207-208 (1988) and New
York Convention, art. 5, supra note 4, 21 U.S.T. 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. 40-42; 9 U.S.C.
§§ 301-02 (Supp. I 1990) and Panama Convention, art. 5, supra note 4, 14 I.L.M. 337.
The ICSID Convention, supra note 4, has no comparable provisions. Its annulment proce-
dure has provoked criticism. See supra note 95. For analysis of UNCITRAL Model Law,
arts. 35 and 36, in the transnational context and its unifying effect on the recognition and
enforcement of international arbitral awards, see Kenneth T. Ungar, The Enforcement of Ar-
bitral Awards Under UNCITRAL 's Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 25 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 717 (1987).
101 Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1294, 1294.2 (West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 52-423 (West 1991); FA. STAT. ANN. § 684.32 (West 1992); GA. CODE ANN.,
§ 9-9-16 (Michie Supp. 1991); HAW. REV. STAT. § 658-15 (1985 Repl.); MD. CTS. &JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2B-08 (Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.67 (Supp. 1991); TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 238-2 (West 1978) with 9 U.S.C. §§ 16(a)(3), 208, 307 (1988,
Supp. I 1990).
102 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988), implementing U.S. CONST., art. III,§ 1 and art. IV, § 1.
See also Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3 (1883).
10S UNIF. ARBITRATION AcT §§ 19(a)(6), 19(b), 7 U.L.A. 216-17 (1985); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 (1988).
104 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
i05 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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fourth situations are covered by the Conventions or the state legisla-
tion. Those states that have enacted the Uniform Foreign Money-
Judgments Recognition Act,' 06 or its equivalent, have provided for
the third situation; there is no federal legislation and only one draft
treaty on the point. 10 7 Other nations, notably the European Com-
munity,' 08 have international agreements to regulate incoming and
outgoing judgments, but not all outgoing U.S. judgments are subject
to them (Situation 4).
Part III analyzes the state legislation in the context of the Con-
ventions, the implementing federal legislation, and federal law.' 0 9
Here, the texts of the state legislation, largely based on the UNCI-
TRAL Model Law, are combined with treaty law, implementing legis-
lation and the federal common law.
III. The State Legislation in the Context of International Agreements
to Which the United States is a Party, Implementing
Federal Legislation, and Other Federal Law
The United States is party to four multilateral treaties governing
arbitration of international transactions of a commercial nature: (1)
the 1958 New York Convention, which around 90 states have rati-
fied;"l 0 (2) the 1965 ICSID Convention dealing with investment dis-
putes between a State and a private investor, also having about 90
106 UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 U.L.A. 263 (1980).
107 Draft Convention on the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments
in Civil Matters, Oct. 26, 1976, U.K.-U.S., reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 71 (1977), which
floundered on differences over the size and punitive nature of some U.S. judgments and
the reach of U.S. judicial jurisdiction. P.M. North, The Draft U.K./U.S.Judgments Convention:
A British Viewpoint, I Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 219, 233-38 (1979). See also Hans Smit, The
Proposed United States-United Kingdom Convention on the Recognition ofjudgments: A Prototype for
the Future?, 17 VA.J. INT'L L. 443 (1977).
108 European Communities Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judg-
ments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 8 I.L.M. 229 (1969), is subject to
numerous protocols and amendatory conventions; a composite text is reprinted in 6A
BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, supra note 4, Doc. No. 8-9 (1991). See also Hague Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
Feb. 1, 1971, 1144 U.N.T.S. 249, to which three States were party as of 1991; European
Communities - European Free Trade Association Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforce-
ment ofJudgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 623 (1989);
Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral
Awards, May 8, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1224 (1979); Agreement of the Arab League Regarding
the Execution ofJudgments, Sept. 14, 1952, reprinted in 6A BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, supra
note 4, Doc. No. 8-1l B. Other nations negotiated bilateral agreements for the recognition
and enforcement of judgments. See, e.g., Convention for the Reciprocal Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Jan. 18, 1934, Fr.-U.K., 171 L.N.T.S. 183.
For tables of these, see 6C BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, supra note 4, Docs. 15-lA - 15-C.
109 See infra notes 110-79 and accompanying text.
110 New York Convention, supra note 4. The precise number of nations party to this
Convention is not clear because of the recent breakup of the USSR and Yugoslavia. Be-
larus (formerly Byelorussian S.S.R.), Ukraine and the Soviet Union all have been formal
parties for some time. The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic
Republic, now merged as Germany, also ratified the Convention separately. U.S. DEPART-
MENT OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 282 (1990).
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ratifications;"I ' (3) the 1975 Panama Convention," t2 limited to Or-
ganization of American States Members, with a dozen parties, and
(4) the MIGA Convention." 3 The ICSID Convention's implement-
ing legislation declares that an award of an arbitral tribunal "cre-
ate[s] a right arising under a treaty of the United States." The FAA
does not apply to award enforcement, and the federal courts are
given exclusive jurisdiction of actions and proceedings involving IC-
SID arbitration."l 4 In comparison, the New York and Panama Con-
vention legislation "deem[s]" any action falling under the treaties as
"aris[ing] under the laws and treaties of the United States." While
state courts have concurrent jurisdiction, there is an explicit right of
removal to the U.S. District Court." l 5
A. Scope of the Federal and State Legislation
The scope of the transactions covered by the conventions is a
combination of treaty law and legislation.
The ICSID Convention's arbitration provisions cover "any legal
dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting
State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting
State designated to the [International] Centre [for Investment Dis-
putes] by that State) and a national of another Contracting State," if
the disputants agree to submit the dispute to the Centre." 1 6 There is
no qualification in the implementing legislation;" t7 thus the scope of
the arbitration is the same as in the Convention.
However, the scope of arbitrations under the New York and
Panama Conventions is less clear. The New York Convention allows
I II ICSID Convention, supra note 4, implemented by 22 U.S.C. §§ 1650-50a (1988).
Although the USSR is not a party, Yugoslavia has ratified the Convention, and the number
of parties is thus less than clear. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 110, at 336.
For general analysis, see Koa, supra note 95, at 507-41; Michael M. Moore, International
Arbitration Between States and Foreign Investors-The World Bank Convention, 18 STAN. L. REV.
1359-63 (1966).
112 Panama Convention, supra note 4.
113 MIGA Convention, supra note 4. For an analysis of the MICA Convention, see
Jurgen Voss, Introductory Note, 24 I.L.M. 1598 (1985) and Panel, The World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund, 1986 PROC. AM. Soc'v INT'L L. 21 (1988).
114 22 U.S.C. § 1650a (1988). The formula for the MIGA Convention, supra note 4, is
the same. 22 U.S.C. §§ 290-9, 290-11 (1988).
115 9 U.S.C. §§ 203, 205 (1988) (implementing legislation for the New York Conven-
tion); 9 U.S.C. § 302 (Supp. 11 1990) (incorporating by reference language from 9 U.S.C.
§§ 203, 205 into the implementing legislation for the Panama Convention).
116 ICSID Convention, art. 25(1), supra note 4, 17 U.S.T. at 1280, 575 U.N.T.S. at 174
(emphasis added). The term "investment" in art. 25(1) was deliberately left undefined, so
that if two disputants agree to the Centre's jurisdiction, there should be no rigid definition
to oust the Centre of jurisdiction. HousE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, CONVENTION ON
THE SETrLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, H.R. REP. No. 1741, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. 2
(1966). The MIGA Convention, supra note 4, approach is similar. See Annex II: Settle-
ment of Disputes Between a Member and the Agency Under Article 57, Art. 1, 24 I.L.M.
1631 ("All disputes within the scope of Article 57").
117 See supra note 114 and implementing legislation.
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parties, on condition of reciprocity, to declare upon ratification that
the recognition and enforcement of awards will only be accorded if
these occur on the territory of another contracting State and that the
Convention will only be applied "to differences arising out of legal
relationships, whether contractual or not,. . . considered as commer-
cial under the natural law of the State making much declaration."" 18
The Panama Convention has a similar provision for territorial appli-
cability. The Convention is declared applicable to "differences that
may arise or have arisen between them with respect to a commercial
transaction," a term otherwise undefined. 19 The United States
filed declarations on both options under the New York Convention,
although awards rendered anywhere on U.S. territory, for whose in-
ternational relations the United States is responsible, are in-
cluded.' 2 0 Other nations have filed similar declarations,12 1 and the
United States has also filed a reservation on territorial applicability
under the Panama Convention. 22 The U.S. legislation implement-
ing the Conventions provides:
An arbitration agreement or arbitral award arising out of a legal re-
lationship, whether contractual or not, which is considered as com-
mercial, including a transaction, contract, or agreement described in
section 2 of this title, falls under the Convention. An agreement or
award arising out of such a relationship which is entirely between
citizens of the United States shall be deemed not to fall under the
Convention unless that relationship involves property located
abroad, envisages performance or enforcement abroad, or has some
other reasonable relation with one or more foreign states .... [A]
corporation is a citizen of the United States if it is incorporated or
has its principal place of business in the United States.123
Section 2 refers to the Federal Arbitration Act, which declares that
agreements to arbitrate are irrevocable:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evi-
dencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or
the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agree-
ment in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy aris-
ing out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 124
118 New York Convention, supra note 4, art. 1(3), 21 U.S.T. 2510, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
119 Panama Convention, supra note 4, arts. 1, 11, 14, I.L.M. 336, 338-39.
120 Declaration of the United States, Sept. 30, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 2566, 751 U.N.T.S.
398.
121 See generally 9 U.S.C.A. 229-35 (Supp. 1991).
122 Reservation of the United States, Oct. 9, 1986, SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS, Inter-American Convention on Commercial Arbitration, S.Ex. REP. No. 99-24, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1986).
123 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1988) (implementing legislation for the New York Convention); 9
U.S.C. § 302 (Supp. 11 1990) (incorporating by reference language from 9 U.S.C. § 202
into the implementing legislation for the Panama Convention).
124 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
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"Maritime transactions" and "commerce" are defined in the FAA as
follows:
"Maritime transactions", as herein defined, means charter parties,
bills of lading of water carriers, agreements relating to wharfage,
supplies furnished vessels or repairs to vessels, collisions, or any
other matters in foreign commerce which, if the subject of contro-
versy, would be embraced within admiralty jurisdiction; "com-
merce", as herein defined, means commerce among the several
States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United
States or in the District of Columbia, or between any such Territory
and another, or between any such Territory and any State or foreign
nation, or between the District of Columbia and any State or Terri-
tory or foreign nation, but nothing herein contained shall apply to
contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce. 125
The courts have given a broad definition to "commerce."' l2 6 The
Convention legislation includes all international "commercial"
transactions under the FAA, plus other applicable "legal relation-
ship[s], whether contractual or not, which [are] considered commer-
cial."' 12 7 Thus, the Convention legislation definition of "commerce"
is at least as broad as the FAA and purports to encompass a broader
scope. 128a
The major question concerns the relative reach of the federal
legislation. When a transaction related to an investment covered by
the ICSID Convention does not arise "directly" out of the invest-
ment, 12 9 by statutory definition, the Convention does not apply for
courts in the United States. Similarly, if a transaction stated to be
''commercial" within the meaning of the state acts is held to be
outside the scope of the federal statutes, then the federal legislation
cannot apply. Does, for example, a local lawyer's contract for profes-
sional services to research a state title for a state subsidiary of a non-
U.S. company fall under the federal legislation if the lawyer sends a
copy of the title to the company? 130 Depending on the factual cir-
cumstances, the transaction, which is certainly commercial, might fall
125 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
126 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 401 (1967).
127 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
128 The FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988), covers both interstate and foreign commerce, while
9 U.S.C. § 202 (and by later incorporation 9 U.S.C. § 302 (Supp. 11 1990)), includes only
foreign commerce. Statement of Richard D. Kearney, supra note 37, at 5-6. See Ungar,
supra note 100, at 723-27, noting how some States have given different, and sometimes
narrow, definitions of "commercial" under the New York Convention.
129 Compare 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-2, 202 (1988), 302 (Supp. 11 1990) with the state legislation
analyzed supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
Is0 "Professional services" are listed in several state statutes, and the transaction
might be deemed to be international in nature under these statutes. See CAL. CiV. PROC.
CODE §§ 1297.13, 1297.16(r) (West Supp. 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-567.31(c), 1-
567.31(e)(10) (Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 36.450(5)(r), 36.454(1) (1991); TEx. REV.
Civ. STAT. art. 249-1, §§ 3, 6(7) (West Supp. 1991); UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 1, supra
note 8, 24 I.L.M. at 1302-03.
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outside the federal legislative coverage, but within the state's statu-
tory coverage, if the disputants choose to arbitrate. 13' If "he dispu-
tants choose to litigate in the federal courts under diversity of
citizenship, 13 2 the federal courts would be obliged to apply the state
arbitration acts to achieve the same outcome that the parties would
obtain in state court litigation. 13
B. Federal Common Law and International Arbitration
Commentators argue for blanket application of federal common
law to international arbitration. 3 4 This might have particular rele-
vance where no treaty relationship exists between states whose na-
tionals have agreed to arbitrate; not all nations are parties to the
ICSID, New York, Panama or MIGA Conventions.' 35 In any event,
the Supreme Court has shown special solicitude for arbitration in the
international context, 136 perhaps indicating the potential for a
broader application of federal common law than seen in the inter-
state context.' 37 Federal common law, although seemingly de-
stroyed as a concept by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins' overruling of Swift v.
Tyson in 1938,138 dates its present pedigree from a diversity decision
involving interstate waters rendered the same day as Erie.' 39 The
"new federal common law"' 40 has particular relevance in maritime
and international transactions,' 4 1 whether decided in the context of
131 Garvey & Heffelfinger, supra note 2, at 213; but see McClendon, supra note 2, at 245.
132 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1335 (1988).
133 Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 200-02 (1956). The Court's contin-
ued solicitude for the states in the arbitration arena is seen in Volt Inform. Serv., Inc. v.
Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 475-79 (1989), allowing the CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE
§ 1281.2(c) (West Supp. 1992) stay procedure to prevail over 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4 (1988),
which was held inapplicable to a transaction otherwise governed by the FAA's definition of
"commerce" in 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1988).
134 See, e.g., Brunel, supra note 2, at 61-68; Carter, supra note 13, at 4, noting the ABA's
favoring of the UNCITRAL Model Law as a replacement for the FAA; Garvey .& Heffelfin-
ger, supra note 2, at 211-21; Rivkin & Kellner, supra note 8, at 539- 40; Washington Foreign
Law Society Rep., supra note 13, at 330. See also Kolkey, supra note 13, at 524-28. The
legislative history of 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1988), implementing the New York Convention,
supra note 4, hints that "Federal authority" would not be broadened, and U.S. citizens'
rights under State laws would not be altered or changed, but the colloquy seems to be
more concerned with the federal courts' subject-matter jurisdiction. See Statement of
Richard D. Kearney, supra note 37, at 10.
135 See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
136 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
137 McClendon, supra note 2, at 248.
138 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 73-78 (1938), overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) 1, 2-18 (1842).
139 Hinderlider v. LaPlata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 113 (1938). A
more modern statement of the interstate waters problem, again involving federal common
law, was Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972).
140 See generally Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Sources of Federal Common Law, 99
HARV. L. REV. 881 (1986); HenryJ. Friendly, In Praise of Erie--and of the New Federal Common
Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 383 (1964).
141 Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Mat'Is., Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981).
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a partial Congressional statutory matrix 142 or as a policy for a na-
tional approach to international transactions in the absence of legis-
lation. 143 The new federal common law is binding on the state
courts as well the as federal courts, 144 and diversity jurisdiction-
based litigation can result in a decision on federal common law
grounds. 145
When the federal government or a federal agency is directly in-
volved, the application of federal common law is almost auto-
matic.146 The same would appear to be true when a foreign
sovereign or its agencies is sued. 147 Of course, Congress can legis-
late for state law standards, as it has done for tort claims against the
government, under the Federal Tort Claims Act.' 48 Additionally,
Congress can supersede the common law by stating a federal law
standard, as it has done in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 149
or the Second Hickenlooper Amendment, which supersedes part of
the federal common law of the act of state doctrine. 150 In the arbi-
tration arena, this might include claims involving the ICSID Conven-
tion, although that treaty has its own arbitration rules' 5 1 for claims
against governments by private investors. Only one case in the
United States' courts appears to have considered ICSID Convention
arbitration issues; 152 it would seem that such litigation would apply
federal common law to cover the gaps. For example, the ICSID Con-
vention provides that the Panel of Arbitrators is keyed to national-
142 Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493-97 (1983) (Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act).
143 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425-26 (1964). Sabbatino was
rapidly superseded in part by statute, the Second Hickenlooper or the Sabbatino Amend-
ment, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (1988), the occasional fate of other federal common-law deci-
sions. See e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n., 453
U.S. 1, 21-22 (1981), noting Congressional action to supersede Illinois v. City of Milwau-
kee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
144 Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666-70 (1962).
145 See Banco National, 376 U.S. at 425-26.
146 See, e.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 330 U.S. 301 (1947); Clearfield Trust
Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190 (1940). But
see Miree v. Dekals County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977).
147 See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 630 (1981); Banco Na-
cional v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
148 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988).
149 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391, 1441, 1601-11 (1988).
150 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (1988), superseding in part Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (164).
151 ICSID Convention, supra note 4, arts. 12-16, 21-22, 25-27, 36-63, 17 U.S.T. 1276-
81, 1284-94, 575 U.N.T.S. 168-76, 182-200; see also ICSID Arb. R., supra note 56, at 61-89.
The same is true for the MICA Convention, supra note 4. See generally Annex II: Settle-
ment of Dispute Between a Member and the Agency Under Article 57, arts. 1, 4-5, 24
I.L.M. 1631-34.
152 Liberian E. Timber Corp. v. Government of Liberia, 650 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y.
1986), aff'd, 854 F.2d 1314 (2d Cir. 1987). Many ICSID arbitral awards and judicial deci-
sions of other nations were reported elsewhere. See generally Koa, supra note 95.
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ity,' 5 3 but has no provision for a definition of nationality, e.g, the
status of dual nationals. Most assuredly that definition would be de-
rived on a federal common law basis by the U.S. District Court.
However, the court might choose to resort to state law if the court
finds that there is little need for a uniform body of federal law for the
problem. As courts have done in other contexts, such as in admiralty
and maritime law, 154 an important, and perhaps controlling, factor
would often be international customary law on the subject.' 55 A sim-
ilar analysis would hold for the Panama Convention, whose article 3
declares that arbitrations shall be governed by the rules of procedure
of the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission.' 5 6 Such
rules, incorporated by reference into the Convention and imple-
mented by federal legislation, 157 would govern for arbitrations and
would displace any state statutory rules to the contrary.' 5 8 However,
to the extent that the Commission rules do not cover a point, that
issue would be covered by federal common law. 159
Even where a court might be persuaded to apply federal com-
mon law, state law may be employed as a gap-filler 160 or to supply
definitions' 6' for the federal common law. Admiralty and maritime
153 The ICSID Rules may cover the gaps. ICSID Convention, supra note 4, arts.
6(l)(b), 6(1)(c), 13, 16(2), 17 U.S.T. at 1274, 1276-77, 575 U.N.T.S. at 164, 168-70.
154 See, e.g., Ralli v. Troop, 157 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1895) (law of general average).
155 The Pacquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (customary law regarding seizure
of coastal fishing vessels in wartime, noting that customary law may be applied only in the
absence of treaties, legislation or executive acts). Since Habana the subject has been cov-
ered by treaties. Hague Convention (XI) Relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard to
the Exercise of the Right to Capture in Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 3, 36 Stat. 2396,
2408-09. This would be the same result for issues covered by the ICSID Convention. See
supra note 140 and accompanying text. See also GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES E. BLACK, THE
LAw OF ADMIRALTY § 6-64, at 482 (2d ed. 1975), commenting on Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345
U.S. 571, 581-82 (1953). For a modern analysis of the determination of customary inter-
national law, see Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
156 Panama Convention, supra note 4, art. 3, 14 I.L.M. at 337. The Inter-American
Commercial Arbitration Commission, Rules of Procedure (1978), are reprinted in 6A BEN-
EDICT ON ADMIRALTY, supra note 4, Doc. No. 7-19.
157 9 U.S.C. §§ 301-07 (Supp. 11 1990).
158 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. For recent examples of federal statutory supersession in
the arbitration context, see Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489-92 (1987); Southland Corp.
v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1984); Saturn Distrib. Corp. v. Williams, 905 F.2d 719, 721-
27 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 11 S.Ct. 527 (1990).
159 The United States is reserved to applying the Commission's rules as of the date of
U.S. ratification, subject to "later [U.S.] official determination to adopt and apply subse-
quent amendments to such rules." SENATE COMM.: ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 122,
at 2, 5.
160 This has been employed most recently in Kamen v. Kemper Finan. Serv., Inc., I l l
S.Ct. 1711, 1717-23 (1991), where the state law of demand futility for the state of incorpo-
ration was applied in a federal common law analysis of the Investment Company Act of
1940, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80a-l(a)-80a-64 (West 1981 & Supp. 1991): "the presumption that
state law should be incorporated into federal common law is particularly strong in areas
where private parties entered legal relationships with the expectation that their rights and
obligations would be governed by state-law standards .... Corporation law is one such
area." Kamen, IIl S. Ct. at 1717.
161 DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580-82 (1956), whose definition of "children"
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law may employ the similar "maritime but local" law principle.' 6 2
Such cases have dealt with matters traditionally within the purview of
the jurisprudence of the 50 states, including internal corporate gov-
ernance, family law and estates, and a local smoke ordinance, as
these state standards were incorporated into national law for the par-
ticular transactions. The analysis has been restated most effectively
in United States v. Kimbell Foods:
Undoubtedly, federal programs that "by their nature are and must
be uniform in character throughout the Nation" necessitate formula-
tion of controlling federal rules. Conversely, when there is little
need for a nationally uniform body of law, state law may be incorpo-
rated as the federal rule of decision. Apart from considerations of
uniformity, we must also determine whether application of state law
would frustrate specific objectives of the federal programs. If so, we
must fashion special rules solicitous of those federal interests. Fi-
nally, our choice-of-law inquiry must consider the extent to which
application of a federal rule would disrupt commercial relationships
predicated on state law. 16 3
Where there are important federal interests, of course, federal
standards will apply, and this would appear to be more likely in ad-
miralty law, maritime law, and the truly international context, 164
rather than in purely domestic transactions. Thus, given the relative
breadth of the definitions of international commercial transactions in
the state acts, the state legislation can be used as either a gap-filler or
to inform definitions, particularly if the transaction contains many
state law policy interests. This is particularly true if Congress ap-
pears to have left an area to the states. 16 5 Use of the state acts as a
basis for federal common law standards in international arbitrations
would be quite helpful where no treaties or implementing federal
legislation apply because the States whose nationals have chosen to
for copyright law is now amended by the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
Ballentine noted the special concern of the states with family law and decedents' estates in
deciding to apply the California decedent's estate laws to permit illegitimate children to
take equally with legitimate heirs when the old Copyright Act spoke only of "children."
See also United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 354-58 (1966). (Texas law of coverture ap-
plied in SBA deficiency suit). One example from arbitration practice is consolidation. See
supra note 62.
162 See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 444-48
(1960), where Detroit was allowed to apply its local pollution ordinance even though a
ship's boilers met federal standards. For analysis of the problem see generally GILMORE &
BLACK, supra note 155, §§ 1-17, 6-61, at 47-51, 463-68.
163 United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728-29 (1979) (citations and
footnotes omitted).
164 Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 735-42 (1961).
165 Cf. Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 313-21 (1955) (no
judicial creation of admiralty rules to govern marine insurance policy terms and warran-
ties, even though marine insurance is a proper subject of the admiralty and maritime juris-
diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333(l) (1988)). For critical commentary on Wilburn Boat, see
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 155, §§ 1-17, at 43-45; DAVID W. ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY
AND FEDERALISM 264-70 (1970); THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW
§ 18-2 (1987); Brunson MacChesney, Marine Insurance and the Substantive Maritime Law: A
Comment on the Wilburn Boat Case, 57 MICH. L. REV. 555 (1959).
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arbitrate have not seen fit to ratify or accede to any international
agreement. ' 6 6
If parties explicitly contract for the terms of the state acts as the
procedural rules for dispute resolution, then the chosen legislation
should be applied as where the parties have chosen institutional arbi-
tration rules. 167 Accordingly, the established principles of applying
parties' choice of institutional arbitration rules as part of the federal
law governing the dispute should be employed to enforce such
agreements according to their terms, 168 subject to any contrary fed-
eral legislation or treaties. 169
C. Application of the State Legislation as State Law
Besides the discretionary gap-filler/definitional employment of
the state legislation in the context of the federal common law, it must
be used where federal law commands such as, e.g., under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 170 or in situations dictated by the outcome-
166 See Loumiet, et al., supra note 2, at 619-20; Mellman, supra note 2, at 387.
167 Some state acts explicitly allow parties to derogate from their terms by selecting
institutional arbitration rules, e.g. those of the AAA. Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 1297.23 (West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-102(e) (West Supp. 1991);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.07(1) (West 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.32(c) (Supp. 1991); OR.
REV. STAT. § 36.456(2) (1991); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 249-2, § 3 (West Supp.
1991) with UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 2(e), supra note 8, at 1303. Contracting parties
may choose the substantive law(s) to govern the transaction. Compare CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §§ 1297.281-1297.285 (West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-128 (West
Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.17 (West 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.58 (Supp.
1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.508 (1991); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 249-28 (West Supp.
1991) with UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 28, supra note 8, at 1309. They may also choose
the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal. Compare CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE
§§ 1297.191-1297.193 (West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-1 19 (West Supp.
1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.07 (West 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.58 (Supp. 1991);
OR. REV. STAT. § 36.490 (1991); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 249-19 (West Supp. 1991)
with UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 19, supra note 8, at 1307. Such being the case, parties
could contract for the application of the entire act of a state to govern dispute resolution
of a transaction, except to the extent that federal law conflicts, see U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl.
2; that the state acts might be construed to limit such a decision, or that the parties would
wish to limit application of the state statutory formula. Such a procedure of contractual
incorporation by reference was employed in ocean carriers' liability under the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), 46 U.S.C. § 1300-15 (1988), such that COGSA continues as a
contractual term when the COGSA coverage as a statute ends. See, e.g., Seguros "Illimani"
S.A. v. M/V Popi P, 929 F.2d 89, 93-94 (2d Cir. 1991) (stevedore liability under COGSA
clause). The carrier may be liable, however, under the Harter Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-95
(1988), if the damage occurs within the purview of that act and outside COGSA legislative
coverage. See, e.g., Antilles Ins. Co. v. Transconex, Inc., 862 F.2d 391 (1st Cir. 1988). The
interplay of COGSA/Harter statutory coverage and the contractual extensions of COGSA
coverage arises in the context of federal statutes, but there would seem to be no problems
in extending state legislation's coverage, subject to the limitations stated supra.
168 See, e.g., Reed & Martin, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 439 F.2d 1268, 1273-74
(2d Cir. 1971). See also supra note 62 (consolidation contract term).
169 See supra note 105 and accompanying text for this analysis.
170 FED. R. Civ. P. 64 requires the district court, regardless of the subject-matter juris-
diction, to employ state prejudgment remedies for the seizure of property, if no federal
statute is involved, enables the court to entertain interim measures requests in accordance
with the state arbitration acts. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
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determinative principle for diversity litigation. 17 1 Although conced-
edly federal common law may play a large role in international arbi-
tration, there remains the possibility that peripheral, local issues
would continue to be governed by state law, particularly if parties
choose state law for the transaction in a contract clause. To be sure,
many of these peripheral claims might be resolved through supple-
mental jurisdiction. 72 However, for the single, isolated, local trans-
action arbitrated after all other claims have been settled, the state
acts would have utility.
D. State-Court Applications
In terms of state-court litigation, the result is the same, but
through a different analysis. The state courts must apply federal
common law.' 73 They must apply pertinent federal legislation,
whether deemed substantive, procedural, or dealing with arbitra-
tion. 174 However, to the extent that no federal law governing arbi-
tration controls, the states are free to establish their own standards
for conducting arbitrations and protecting the arbitral process.' 75
Thus, the state courts may employ the state international arbitration
acts in much the same way as the federal courts employ them. Given
the near paralysis of federal courts overwhelmed with criminal cases,
particularly those connected with the war on drugs,' 76 the opportu-
171 Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 200-02 (1956).
172 Under the implementing legislation for the ICSID, MICA, New York and Panama
Conventions, supra note 4, all litigation has a federal question base, and each convention
has a special removal statute. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text. The 1990
supplemental jurisdiction legislation, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367, 1441(c) (Supp. 11 1990), assures
the inclusion of all transaction-related claims subject to international arbitration under the
treaties in federal court. To the extent that at least one claim is anchored in federal com-
mon law, which falls under the federal question head, Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406
U.S. 91, 100 (1972), the same result should obtain. For analysis of the 1990 legislation,
see Richard D. Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity: Life After Finley and the
Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 445 (1991); Thomas M. Mengler, Stephen B.
Burbank & Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Congress Accepts Supreme Court's Invitation to Codify Supple-
mental Jurisdiction, 74 JUDICATURE 213 (1991); John B. Oakley, Recent Statutory Changes in the
Law of Federal Jurisdiction and Venue: The Judicial Improvements Acts of 1988 and 1990, 24 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 735, 757-69 (1991). Admiralty jurisdiction-based claims subject to arbitra-
tion must follow their own nonstatutory pendent jurisdiction analysis, since maritime cases
are not part of the federal question jurisdiction. Romero v. International Terminal Oper-
ating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 380-81 (1959); Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d
800, 809-11 (2d Cir. 1971).
173 See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
174 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 401 (1967); Dice v.
Akron, C. & Y. R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 361-62 (1952); Brown v. Western Ry. of Alabama, 338
U.S. 294, 295-90 (1949); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389-94 (1947); Garrett v. Moore-
McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 243-49 (1942).
175 Volt Inform. Serv., Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 475-79 (1989).
176 See generally Diana G. Culp, Fixing the Federal Courts, 76 A.B.A.J. 62, 64 (June 1990);
Debra Cassens Moss, Drug Cases Clog the Courts, 76 A.B.A.J. 34 (Apr. 1990); Panel, The
Drugging of the Courts: How Sick Is the Patient and What Is the Treatment? 73 JUDICATURE 314
(1990); Franklin M. Zweig et al., Securing the Future for America's State Courts, 73 JUDICATURE
296, 299 (1990).
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nity for state-court litigation ancillary to international arbitrations
seems greater today than ever before.
IV. Conclusions and Projections for the Future
Part III demonstrates that state legislation can play an impor-
tant, even if subordinate, role in international arbitration and might
be considered by all states for enactment. The UNCITRAL Model
Law, a prototype for several of the state acts, could serve as a worka-
ble approach to promoting uniformity. As in the case of the Uniform
Arbitration Act, currently in force in nearly all the states, there have
been local variations. Some of these variations were enacted because
of state court structure or procedural nuances, while others were en-
acted because of other perceived needs. 17 7 Other jurisdictions will
undoubtedly follow with their legislation, building on the first round
of statutes and hopefully following the UNCITRAL model in force in
a majority of states that now have the acts.
The result may be a crazy-quilt of statutes, with a babble of over
50 voices, advertising the virtues of their particular dispute resolu-
tion systems, if one counts the legislatures of the U.S. possessions.
This would be but a substitute, in part, for the current system, if it is
duly considered that federal common law will be applied perhaps
with reference to state legislation when disputants have not agreed
to particularized rules. In terms of predictability, the present system
of basic federal legislation, including the FAA or federal statutes to
implement Conventions the statutes implement, is reasonably good,
provided the parties negotiate rules of arbitral procedure, perhaps
tied to an institution. If the parties fail to choose arbitral procedure
rules, and particularly if there is no state international arbitration
legislation to reference, the predictability may be worse than the sit-
uation where a state act is available. The most egregious case occurs
where the non-U.S. party is from a nation that is not a party to any
Convention, and therefore, enforcement mechanisms are limited to
the FAA, if foreign commerce is involved, and the general state arbi-
tration statutes.
The individual state international arbitration statutes are there-
fore valuable interim gap-fillers.178 What may be needed in the near
future is some semblance of national uniformity. One agency for this
task is the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, which has celebrated its centennial, 179 and is the sponsor of
the Uniform Arbitration Act. The major national dispute resolution
177 Walker, supra note 17, at 906. The limitations on arbitration sites are an unfortu-
nate example of the latter. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
178 Kolkey, supra note 13, at 510.
179 Frederick H. Miller, et al., Introduction to Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey: The
Centennial of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 46 Bus. LAw. 1449
(1991).
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agencies, which have promoted standard rules, are another.1 8 0 Bar
associations are a third source of possible consistency.' 8 ' These
groups are studying the advisability of federal legislation, perhaps
paralleling the UNCITRAL Model Law.
Given the heavy infusion of federal common law into the inter-
national arbitral process, national legislation is the best course. As
the debate proceeds, the state acts, along with the UNCITRAL
Model Law and other models, may serve as valuable references; as
the states have long been the laboratories for effecting legal change
in the Union. After the enactment of any federal legislation, the state
acts, perhaps made uniform through amendment, will continue to
serve as either gap-fillers and definitional sources or as laws in their
own right in the state and federal courts. Until Congress acts, and
that could be some time in coming, the state international arbitration
legislation will serve as a useful, if perhaps varied, guide to this form
of alternative dispute resolution. In the current state of the econ-
omy, the states, and indeed the Nation, need all the business that can
be generated, and state statutes can serve as an inducement, 8 2 albeit
limited and varied by jurisdiction, to foreign investors whose prefer-
ences are for arbitration, rather than for litigation, when disputes
arise.
180 For example, the American Arbitration Association, which has appointed a com-
mittee to study the UNCITRAL Model Law and the possibility of proposed FAA amend-
ments. James H. Carter, AAA Committee Studies Possibility of U.S. Adoption of Model Law, 2
WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 319 (1991).
181 See, e.g., Committee Rep., supra note 13; Washington Foreign Law Society Rep.,
supra note 13.
182 McClendon, supra note 2, at 257.
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